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Introduction 
The impermanence and unreliability of all human products is inherent in engine-
ering and economic practice, and also in every individual’s everyday life. We do 
not truly expect that anything will serve us “forever”, but we are annoyed if some-
thing fails unexpectedly. Therefore, for the provider of the product or service, raising 
the level of reliability is a challenge taken up as part of professional business orga-
nisation in the broad sense – both academically and commercially. 
Providing reliable operation of equipment and technical systems has been 
known since the dawn of industrial history, or at least since the 19th-century indu-
strial revolution. To this day, science is developing reliability theory, positioned at 
the juncture of mathematics and the technical sciences. The issue of technical fa-
ilures, their causes and effects, or the interference they cause, is inherent in engi-
neering behaviour, and extensive experience in both verifying the scientific findings 
and shaping professional best practice in the design of devices and systems with 
established reliability, and the drawing up of organisational solutions with predicted 
failure of the devices used in mind.
At the same time, there is no analogously advanced theory for the efficiency 
of entities which are business and administrative in nature. Their efficiency is un-
dermined by the impact of operational risks (to a large extent organisational), i.e. 
the risks to which an organisation is susceptible mainly due to imperfections in 
internal processes, shortage of employee skills or poor resource management. 
Over recent years, this issue has been included in the catalogue of risk types in 
business practice which are identified and measured, and in the face of which appro-
priate technical and organisational security, and ultimately appropriately estimated 
financial reserves have been created.
This paper is a summary of the author’s achievements and his research on the 
problematic triad “Operational Risk – Resource Security – Business Continuity”, 
which have regularly been presented in earlier publications, the most important 
(in logical content order) are shown below.
1. In terms of “operational risk” issues:
  Uncertainty in management [2007], VIII International Conference “Financial 
Management – Risk Management and Value Creation”, University of Szczecin, 
Międzyzdroje April 18-20, “Scientific Papers” No. 455.
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  The concept of operational risk and a classification of types [2010], “Organi-
sation Review” (Polish original: “Przegląd Organizacji”) No. 6.
  Operational risk and its estimation [2008] (co-author M. Soczko), [in:] 
Knosala R. (ed.), Computer Integrated Management, Opole University of 
Technology Publishing House, Opole.
  (Ed.) Operational Risk Management [2008], (academic co-editor I. Staniec), 
C.H. Beck, Warsaw.
2. In terms of “resource security”:
  TSM - Total Security Management. Recommendations for the creation of an 
Operational Security Policy [2003], (co-authors: M. Blim, M. Byczkowski) 
European Network Security Institute, Warsaw.
  Information Security Aspect of Operational Risk Management [2009], (co-au-
thor M. Byczkowski), “Foundations of Management” No. 2.
  Security of information systems [2012], (co-author F. Wołowski), edu-Libri, 
Kraków.
3. In terms of “Business Continuity”:
  Business continuity and management theory [2006], “The Economics and 
Organisation of Enterprises” (Polish original: “Ekonomika i organizacja 
przedsiębiorstwa”) No. 4.
  Ensuring business continuity in limiting operational risk [2010], (co-author 
P. Gołąb), [in:] J. Monkiewicz, Gąsiorkiewicz L. (ed.), Managing risk in 
business continuity, C.H. Beck, Warsaw. 
  Business Continuity [2010], “Foundations of Management” No. 2.
  A proposed methodology for managing business continuity [2003], “Organi-
sation Review” (Polish original: “Przegląd Organizacji”) No. 6.
  An model for evaluating the maturity of business continuity management 
in an organisation [2007], “Organisation Review” (Polish original: “Przegląd 
Organizacji”) No. 4.
The issue of systematically improved business continuity in an organi-
sation in the management of operational risk is closely linked with other issues 
in management science. This can be seen when the highlighted wording is concep-
tually analysed.
  Continuity is a positive feature of active conduct similar in meaning to 
such concepts as: consistency, durability, resistance, or tradition. In other 
words, consistency is to be understood as a deliberate sequence of successive 
operations with a set goal and combined in such a way that not only do 
they not interfere with each other, but also some of the earlier operations 
serve as preparation for some of the later. 
  Operation is unambiguously associated with activity.
  Business continuity is the evaluation of an activity perceived as consistent 
and resistant to obstacles. In other words, organisational procedures forming 
the organisation’s ability to respond effectively in the event of disruption.
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  Organisation, in this sense, is synonymous with an entity which is a system 
of operations created in society for economic, administrative, non-profit, 
etc. purposes.
  Systematic improvement is the flagship postulate of quality management, 
and business continuity, as the postulate for efficient activity, is one of a list 
of specific quality demands on an organisation’s operation, in addition, at 
both the strategic and operative management levels. On both levels, im-
provement is one of the criteria for the realisation of an objective, closely 
related to others such as effectiveness, efficiency and productivity. 
  Systematic improvement is also a basic principle of a learning organisa-
tion and knowledge management. This means the ability to analyse and 
evaluate events in the current practices of the organisation and draw conc-
lusions from them for the future.
  Provision is synonymous with a whole range of terms representing a cer-
tain type of operation (supply, development, preparation, manipulation, 
influence), including organisational.
  Management is control appropriate to circumstances over the realisation 
of a specific organisational goal based on the resources at its disposal.
  Business continuity refers to the management of operational risk. It is a form 
of influence over the level of this risk, although not directly, as it does not 
include efforts to change the causes of that risk or the mechanism of its 
actualisation, but only efforts to increase resistance to its manifestations. 
The important turning point is therefore the moment at which business 
continuity solutions guarantee the organisation’s influence over the mani-
festations of risk, and which takes place after the occurrence of the critical 
event that is a consequence of the risk. 
  Business continuity also includes another category of activities aimed at 
reducing the risk by means of security procedures. They can, like business 
continuity, rely on reducing the organisation’s vulnerability to the impact 
of risk, but they can also directly intervene in the causes of the risk and 
its mechanism. In addition, these relationships may appear as do those in 
the framework of operational risk management, to only include solutions 
in security (in practice this is frequent, though usually resulting from a lack 
of foresight) or only in the field of business continuity (in practice very 
rare, usually occurring when the assessment of economic rationality shows 
for the omission of providing security solutions), or providing security inte-
grated with continuity (in fact an ever more frequent  case, and displaying 
a mature and economically rational approach to risk management. For these 
reasons, providing security and ensuring business continuity should be seen 
as part of operational risk management. 
  This wording in full is also axiomatic. Within it lies the effort to ensure 
smooth, and therefore safe, well-organised, properly targeted, reprodu-
cible and efficient operation. In particular, security, and, by its relationship 
with it, business continuity, too, are fundamental values in the functioning 
of society and individuals.
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The scope of the book includes several issues that intertwine with each other 
in a specific manner, as shown in Table W.1. 
The objectives of table W.1 may also be interpreted as corresponding to the 
hypotheses that:
  there is a problematic triad Risk – Security – Continuity, and a crucial 
feature is functional integrity, which should lead to an integrated system 
of concepts,
  there is a real relationship of complementarity between the provision of bu-
siness continuity and other types of interaction mitigating operational risk, 
  there are criteria which enable the necessary classification of operational 
risk,
  it is possible to develop the aforementioned principles and methodologies 
of analysis and design.
The realisation and verification of these hypotheses were served by research 
which allowed the establishment and improvement of the business continuity 
model, the methodology of its implementation, and then verification of its appli-
cability in real projects. 
The book comprises 6 chapters and summaries.
The first chapter defines the objective and scope of the book, and characterises 
the major perspectives of the issue of operational risk and business continuity. 
The second chapter presents the current state of knowledge and common 
problems in defining and classifying risk which, although decades of research have 
been conducted on them, are still not fully resolved. The reason for this is the wi-
despread acceptance, as leading, of the financial prospect in relation to the full 
spectrum of risk types. Meanwhile, operational risk, as opposed to other types 
of risk, requires a specific approach, including its analysis in terms of the organi-
sation. The author’s scientific contribution is presented as a research problem to 
develop a universal classification of risk, taking into account: 
  the specificity of the structure of the economy as the sum of sectors through 
the selection of criteria taking into account that specificity, 
  The universal features of the organisation,
  the determinants of the nature of the risk.
The third chapter characterises operational risk, indicating that in essence it is 
a problematic triad: Risk – Security – Business Continuity. The currently dominant 
approach to capital adequacy, specific to the financial disciplines, is shown and its 
shortcomings are discussed. The conclusion presents, based on the theory of orga-
nisation, proprietary classification of types of operational risk, coherently combined 
using several criteria related to the process approach to management of the organi-
zation, a model-cycle management of the organisation and strict compound vulne-
rability to the risk of the main types of resources of the organisation and organizing 
their use.
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The fourth chapter presents the classic model of the risk management pro-
cess, in which a critical element is the identification of risk and its consequence, 
analysis, assessment, selection of treatment of the risk, and monitoring. The proper 
discipline of management science is emphasised, not always present in the approach 
of other disciplines, which is an analytical approach towards the “cause of the risk 
– the mechanism by which the risk proceeds – the effects of risk” as the only one 
which fully dissects, describes, and assesses the essence of risk. The author’s con-
tribution to the science is a four-layer learning approach in monitoring risks.
The fifth chapter presents the issues of providing security and business conti-
nuity in terms of Total Security Management, which sees them as mutually comple-
mentary to the potential threat, i.e. in the sense of a preventive action on the part 
of security assurance solutions, and repair and substitution on the part of provi-
sion of business continuity. The author’s contribution to the study (emphasising 
the crucial role of Maciej Byczkowski, a long-term partner in research on this issue) 
is characterised by the universal security principles and the specific rules related 
to the organisational approach from the perspective of the protection of particular 
types of organisational resources.
The sixth chapter contains a formulation of the conclusion of the author’s 
many years of research on the provision of business continuity as a complex of 
actions whose aim is the impact of the identified risk factors and the response to 
each, as well as unidentified manifestations of risk, to minimise its impact on the 
business of the organisation. In the pioneering period (the 1990s) of the crystalli-
sation of views on this issue and the formulation of the first proposals for good 
practice, the author’s research has been directed in the first part to defining the 
methodology of designing business continuity solutions. The second part consisted 
of verifying whether the methodological premises are reflected in the preparation 
of companies that – pressured by the regulations introduced – undertook a systema-
tic process of implementation and maintenance of business continuity solutions, 
where they included them formally in their structure and organisational practice. 
At the same time and gradually, the formulated published standards of good practice 
on this issue were considered. On the basis of the research, a final methodological 
model, named TSM/BCP (Total Security Management – Business Continuity 
Planning) was elaborated, and an assessment of its applicability was conducted. 
The end of the chapter presents the principles of verifying the degree of maturity 
of managing the provision of business continuity. 
The summary contains a review of the author’s scientific contribution and 
the conclusions of this study, and further research issues that arise from the book 
are indicated. The author is aware that the approach presented of the main issue 
in this publication sets out new research questions. The principles of business con-
tinuity presented aim to improve measures directed towards stabilising the orga-
nisation’s operation under conditions of uncertainty and associated risks. These 
organisational changes are often associated with destructive activities, i.e. first 
a weakening of the existing state takes place, then change, and then it is replaced 
with a new solution, which in turn should be fixed. The approach presented in this 
book involves a simplification in relation to reality which is the existence of certain 
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invariants in the organisation, such as: business objectives, the environment, 
processes, resources, structure, etc. Interference which appears triggers the orga-
nisation’s stabilising mechanisms, bringing it to a state close to the initial. Thus, 
the principles of providing business continuity support the concepts of change 
management, innovation management, knowledge management, the concepts of 
agile, learning organisations, and so on. Against this backdrop, questions may be 
raised – Is the violation of business continuity always a threat to the organisation? 
How should we treat the introduction of organisational changes which also violate 
the organisation’s business continuity? Can the results obtained in the book be used 
in change management (to ensure business continuity in the organisation in which 
the changes are made) and how? These and similar questions are left as a matter 
for further research. Firstly, the new issue in its basic shape should be set out. 
1. Introduction to the issue
In the sphere of economic management and the theory in support of this practice, 
we may observe a dramatic increase in interest in risk. It is becoming a significant 
management problem. This fact is not solely caused by the accumulation of existing 
knowledge and practices and their development. It stems more from the fact that 
the strong trends of liberalisation and globalisation in the world economy has 
led to unprecedented intensification of market competition. This automatically 
increases the risk of failure of individual economic projects and the economic activity 
as a whole conducted by the organisation1. All indications are that the existing 
strategies for an organisation’s activities are not sufficient to minimise risk, and 
the side effects of these strategies can mean that organisations become victims 
of unaccounted-for risk, the conflicting expectations of stakeholders and the orga-
nised management, both for consumers and groups of monopolistic producers.
In this context, work is ongoing on exploring the contemporary model of the 
organisation. In an attempt to define it, the idea and the concept of “the enterprise 
of the future” has been elaborated. This concept is an attempt to respond to the 
challenges of the progress of civilisation, as well as economic development and 
technical thought. Evidence of this are:
  firstly – the information revolution that means that the chief capability of 
any organisation becomes knowledge management,
  secondly – the pressure of the environment on the organisation resulting 
from variable market demand, expectations of high standards of quality 
products and services, the rapid development of technologies and tech-
niques, and the evolution of legal requirements. 
These are also practical and direct manifestations of globalisation.
A particular consequence of the rise of competition is the search for and im-
plementation of increasingly sophisticated workflow, manufacturing, and services 
solutions. This in turn exposes the organisations implementing such solutions to 
a specific type of risk directly associated with organisational operation and availabi-
lity of internal resources. This risk is called operational. Its importance and impact on 
1  This is the subject of research on theory of risk society, see. [Beck, 1986].
151. Introduction to the issue
the effectiveness of the organisation will continue to grow, and with them the need 
for scientific penetration of the nature, sources and manners of manifestation of 
operational risk and the organisation’s ability to respond to such risks.
In addition, a series of dramatic economic and political developments in recent 
years has shown the world that the mere awareness of specific types of risk is in-
sufficient if you do not apply comprehensive, mature management of them, and 
this entails both the need to control the feedback in the risk management cycle 
[Conrow, 2000], and the need for substitute activity in the case of ineffectiveness 
of this management [Gołąb, 2009]. The most obvious example of this was the 
issue of the year 2000 (also called Y2K). Firms became aware in the early 1990s 
that most of the software produced for computer systems relied on an incorrect 
entry for recording the date in 2000; the Y2K problem mobilised literally the whole 
world to conduct risk analyses, implement remedial programs, and make emergency 
plans in case these adjustments were ineffective. The methods and organisational 
principles of risk analysis, removal of faults, and emergency plans developed at 
the time are still used and improved to this day. This particular issue, the conse-
quence of a technical simplification (years later to be fateful), probably influenced 
the theory of risk management, security assurance and guarantee of business con-
tinuity and their practical dissemination more strongly than even such dramatic 
events as the terrorist attack on 11 September 2001.
Other types of conclusion arose as a consequence of the collapse of Barings 
Bank in 1995 and the power company Enron in 2001. Both events resounded 
widely throughout the worldwide economy. Both occurred due to the lack of suffi-
cient regulation:
  internal (Barings) – the collapse was caused by the serial fraud of a seemingly 
insignificant employee,
  systemic (Enron) – there were abuses by top management in collusion with 
an audit company.
The falls of both companies significantly influenced the foundations of the risk 
management model. The need was particularly confirmed to expand the monitoring 
and supervision of feedback in the risk management cycle, including at the level 
of the national supervisory authorities and regulators. Attention was also paid to 
the importance for the organisation not only of financial (business) risk, but the 
rapidly growing importance of operational (organisational) risk [Ebnöther, Vanini, 
McNeil, Antolinez, 2003].
Finally, natural and technical disasters in recent years, such as the tsunami in 
several Asian countries, hurricanes in the Caribbean Sea, failures of offshore drilling 
platforms and nuclear power plants, demonstrated the scarcity of organisational 
preparation within local communities, authorities and employees of public admini-
stration, and entities established to provide assistance. The scale of the aggressiveness 
of these dangers to a large extent explains the true insufficiency of the reaction, 
but also indicates the need for a methodical procedure in building response mecha-
nisms. In Poland, it is to such inferences, brought about by the dramatic flooding 
in Lower Silesia in 1997, that we owe the powerful monitoring system for the upper 
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Oder, and the principles of cooperation between those services called to assist and 
the bodies appointed to monitor natural phenomena.
The current state of the approach to threats such as those mentioned above 
indicates the general importance of the issue of risk in the economy and ongoing 
business activity. The Polish economist Professor K. Jajuga says: “The importance 
of risk management has increased in recent years around the world, mainly due to 
the increase in risk in the economy. The main elements indicating the development 
of risk management are:
  the emergence of new theoretical solutions in the field of risk analysis and 
management, which are at the basis of advanced theoretical tools,
  the inclusion by economic operators of risk management in the overall 
management strategy,
  the rise of the profession of risk manager,
  the introduction of requirements for information about risk management 
strategy in financial statements,
  the formation of databases enabling risk assessment,
  the creation by professional communities and by supervisors and regulatory 
bodies of standards and requirements for risk management,
  the emergence of international and national organisations which disseminate 
knowledge and professional standards in the field of risk management”.
Worthy of particular emphasis is the fact that, although the main instances 
mentioned above relate to financial firms, the nature of the problems, and especially 
the recommended methods of dealing with them, are organisational in nature and 
therefore belong to a large extent to the specific discipline of management science, 
and not just financial science. Very often there is the association of risk with 
the financial sector and the financial sciences. At the same time, it might be said 
that it is the financial sector and the financial sciences we have to thank for the 
advancement in dealing with risk issues, while its natural scope is covered by issues 
relevant to three disciplines of the field of economics: economics, finance and 
management sciences, and further a number of other disciplines in the fields of 
social sciences and technical sciences at least.
With regard to operational risk, this indicates an interesting question, which 
will be developed in this book, that the financial sciences mainly develop methods 
for determining the necessary level of capital adequacy (reserves sufficient to com-
pensate for the loss), while the essence of the materialisation of operational risk 
(the specific mechanism which leads from causes to effects) can be determined, 
and consequently its level affected, on the basis of action which is the subject 
of study of other sciences than finance, especially management sciences. 
The procedure which directly affects the essence of operational risk and 
enables us to influence its level is to consciously combine prevention (hedging 
solutions, made possible by the understanding of its causes) and the practised 
ability to undertake therapy (solutions enabling continued activity). Both of these 
issues are the essence of understanding operational risk as the problematic triad 
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Risk – Security – Continuity, which as a scientific proposition is the author’s contri-
bution to the science, and which will be discussed in this book. 
Figure 1.1. Components of risk management, security assurance, and assurance of business con-
tinuity (within organisation and management theory) with the theory of technical reliability and crisis 
management 
Particularly important for the expression of the ability to control the level of 
risk is maintenance of the capability to preserve business continuity. Firstly, this 
is the postulate for perfection in the system’s operation that is every organisation. 
In this sense, ensuring business continuity is the subject of strategic management; 
it expresses the overriding objective of organisational efficiency and includes 
leadership in the area of operational risk management [De Wit, Meyer, 2005]. 
From the strategic perspective, it remains an issue on the border of the disciplines 
of economics and management sciences. Secondly, business continuity is understood 
as organisational behaviour forming the organisation’s ability to respond effectively 
in the event of disruption resulting from the interaction between specific manife-
stations of threats and the organisation’s internal susceptibility, its infrastructure, 
resources and organisational solutions. In this sense, ensuring business continuity 
is the subject of operational management and is the last link in the operational risk 
management chain.
Operational risk has only recently become a separate category of risk. The first 
widely accepted definition was proposed in 1999 by the British Bankers Association 
[BBA, ISDA, RMA, 1999], and the most recent, provided by the Basel Committee 
7
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in the cyclically amended document Sound Practices for the Management and 
Supervision of Operational Risk [Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2010], 
comes from 2004. The primary reason for the frequent updates to Sound Practices... 
is the imprecise separation of risks classified into this category, and continued 
focus on the clarification of the particular interpretation of this recommendation. 
This points to its basic problem – the lack of a scientifically structured look at opera-
tional risk taking into account the approaches of different fields and disciplines.
From the essence of operational risk, which always accompanies any activity, 
it flows that it is of interest for all disciplines related to the functioning of the 
organisation, particularly in economics, finance and management. The levels of this 
interest, and thus the state of the art in terms of the various disciplines, are different. 
In these deliberations it has been limited to the field of economics, but it is clear 
that a number of aspects of the problem of control of risks would be covered by the 
legal, technical or social sciences. In addition, it must be emphasised that in terms 
of the operationalisation of risk management, this book focuses on ensuring busi-
ness continuity.
The most important factor in these considerations is that in these works the 
financial view of risk assessment dominates. This involves the use of the approach 
to operational risk stemming from the many years of experience of the Basel Com-
mittee (and the economic and scientific communities associated with it) in the 
assessment of individual risk types, conducted in order to determine the capital 
adequacy. As a result, a clear gap is perpetuated in knowledge about the possibi-
lities of impacting on operational risk other than the creation of financial reserves. 
“Others” here entails legal, organisational and technical means.
The author of this book in his papers has emphasised the need for expanding 
the list of issues concerning operational risk to cover: 
  crisis management,
  environmental security,
  process security,
  labour safety,
  occupational risk,
  personal security,
  information security,
  IT security,
  physical security,
  technical security,
  protection of tangible and intangible assets,
  business continuity.
Only such an extended approach will allow the full use of the sciences of or-
ganisation and management in order to mitigate risk. More importantly, only such 
an approach will enable the realisation that it is exactly this type of risk that refers 
to the phenomena and problems in the field of management, which – although 
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previously not assigned to operational risk – have long been known and may provide 
proven organisational and managerial concepts, methods and techniques.
Management is a scientific discipline as strongly associated with practice, 
as are perhaps only the technical sciences, and this relationship, it is probably no 
coincidence, lies in the industrial roots of the first concepts of the theory of orga-
nisation and then management. Thus it is an applied science, and all its concepts 
are always verified empirically. This entails a specific pragmatism that must be 
inherent in these concepts in order for them to be accepted by scientific commu-
nities (theorists) and in business environments (practitioners). This pragmatism in 
the first place requires that the consideration of any conception of those elements 
that bring it to the realities of practice, which is in fact not fully possible, should 
at least ensure that the degree of simplification of reality in the theoretical model 
be as small as possible. In turn, in scientific analytical techniques the point is that 
the tested reality actually determines all those elements that constitute its true 
variability, volatility and dynamics. An important challenge for management is 
the fact that very often the standardised, typical approach, based on statistical 
regularities does not lead to the expected results, and success is sometimes associated 
with deviating from the standards and statistics.
The perspective of risk (and actually three integrated perspectives: Risk – 
Security – Business Continuity) in the author’s opinion may become the key to 
the interpretation of contemporary management challenges. The reasons for this 
position are as follows (and are explained in detail in this book):
  by analysing the risk the reasons for the limited predictability of any action 
is clarified as fully as possible,
  by setting the course the security most fully indicates the method for 
improving this predictability,
  ensuring business continuity most fully expresses the human desire for full 
capability with regard to difficulties in activities undertaken.
In this context, we should look at contemporary management concepts and 
the place of operational risk, which on the one hand may be an element of the 
proper approach to a given concept, while on the other it may be the subject of 
relevant interaction for a given concept. This is generally shown in Table 1.1, 
which presents the most common current concepts discussed, where we must 
remember that they do not usually mutually exclude each other, often use the same 
methods, techniques and management tools, and in a given organisation create 
current management practice.
It follows from the above, and will be shown more precisely later, that opera-
tional risk is always present in the management of organisation whatever the ma-
nagement concept. However, in the opposite sense, i.e. in answer to the question 
“which of the management concepts is particularly well suited to clarifying the 
essence of operational risk”, we should look towards the process approach, the 
resource approach and the approach of a learning organisation. 
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Table 1.1. Modern management concepts in the context of operational risk management
Types  
of approach Management Concepts 
Examples of typical relationships  
with operational risk
Focus on  
the management 
of the organisation
Pro-market oriented In particular, the risk of inappropriate decision making. 
Pro-quality and and value 
oriented
Ensuring security and business continuity in the con-
text of quality assurance. There is also a suggestion 
that operational risk management is generally part of 
quality management. The issues of the danger of lo-
sing value both financially and organisationally.
Results and efficiency 
oriented
Taking account of operational risk in terms of avo-
iding disruption.
The danger of internal overregulation, the issue of 
preserving the primacy of results over security.
Process oriented Identification and analysis of critical processes.
Project oriented Project risk management.
Logistics oriented Disruption and interruption of the supply chain as a typical challenge in logistics management.
Oriented towards:
• reengineering,
• outsourcing, 
• cloud computing
Security and continuity of services in the context 
of a radical reorganisation.
Oriented towards:
• social responsibility, 
• ethics 
• trust
Irresponsibility as an analogy of danger, and as its 
cause. The scarcity of social capital as a basis for 
sustainable development (education and training).
Oriented towards:
• knowledge, 
• competences, 
• intellectual capital, talent
Lack of knowledge or lagging behind development.
Oriented towards early 
warning The practical usefulness of prevention of threats.
Oriented towards deals (in 
the context of the resource 
approach)
Risk as opportunity.
Infonomics oriented Dependence on information and the efficiency of the processing system.
Focus on 
organisational 
changes
Oriented towards radical 
changes Risk constitutes a typical context for introducing 
changes (issues: effectiveness of the change, appro-
priate procedure, an accurate deadline, etc.Oriented towards systematic 
changes
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Types  
of approach Management Concepts 
Examples of typical relationships  
with operational risk
Focus on 
organisational 
changes
Oriented towards bench-
marking
Inappropriate selection of template, improper adapta-
tion process.
Oriented towards innovation In particular, the risk of inappropriate innovation deci-sions.
Focus on 
organisational 
forms
Oriented towards:
• a learning organisation,
• an intelligent organisation,
• a flexible organisation
Lagging behind development, the lack of organisational 
flexibility.
oriented towards network 
organisation Danger of breaking their inefficiency of ties.
oriented towards virtual 
organisation Dependence on teleinformatics, for example.
Return to traditional management concepts 
Systemically oriented The selection and interaction of components of the organisation as a system.
Resource oriented Identification of critical resources, the “minimum acceptable configuration”.
Oriented towards time and individual energy Human-specific susceptibility to the individual condi-tions of operation.
The process approach is the basis for determining the most the sensitive parts 
of an organisation’s activity viewed as a set of critical processes. An analysis of 
their sensitivity allows the identification of a set of critical resources, i.e. the most 
vulnerable, and at the same time the key for the ability to maintain continuity of 
critical processes. 
In recent years, there has been a form of renaissance of the resource approach. 
Regardless of critical comment with reference to the strategic view of this approach, 
in the context of risk analysis (in terms of business continuity) it is essential in 
view of the fact that the organisational disruption of business continuity always 
consists of a direct loss of resources or loss of control over resources. This sets the 
mode of the analytical approach in providing security and business continuity.
Another issue is the aspect of organisational culture, which in order to ensure 
business continuity should rely on continuous improvement, both in terms of risk 
analysis and response to the symptoms of risk, and therefore should rely on solu-
tions providing security and continuity.
The question of knowledge of the issues of guaranteeing the management of 
business continuity itself requires further discussion. There are three general 
scientific perspectives here – economics, finance, and management. From the 
economic perspective, the primary objective is to ensure business continuity and 
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financial continuity (capability). This is connected with macro activities (global 
and regional phenomena) and microeconomic on the level of traders. Ensuring 
economic continuity should take place by the identification of the degree of uncer-
tainty in the prospects for economic phenomena and selection of activities with an 
acceptable level of risk. Each perspective is characterised by basic categories and 
processes between which occur the basic dependencies for determining business 
continuity (Fig. 1.2). Macro categories dominate, such as inflation, which not only 
affects the other categories and macroeconomic processes, but also affects opera-
tional and financial continuity, and then microeconomic processes. In addition, 
there are common categories, such as the macro-, operational, and micro- produc-
tion. All of these require special studies in terms of the problematic triad of risk - 
security - continuity.
Management Continuity
Field Continuity  
operational microeconomics
financial macroeconomics
Figure 1.2. Economics and continuity in terms of basic perspectives
Suggested in theoretical considerations and essential in business practice 
is also the analysis of business continuity from the perspective of accounting 
(finances). In this perspective, continuity is analysed by studying economic proces-
ses on the basis of economic events and the financial accounting system. The crucial 
issue is to analyse the use of economic data by the company (both organisational 
and financial performance):
  in macro terms in terms of inflation (including expected inflation), unem-
ployment, economic growth, exchange rate differences;
  in micro terms in terms of competitiveness, innovation, demand and its 
flexibility, expected innovation, investment processes. 
This analysis refers to the distribution in Figure 1.2, as ensuring financial 
continuity is achieved through the analysis and selection of the manners of proper 
liquidity management and ensuring operational continuity through the analysis 
and selection of ways to manage competitiveness, changes in demand and changes 
in obtaining all three essential factors of production.
In turn, in the study of management, the issue of business continuity as inter-
preted specifically in this science has thus far only been undertaken residually, 
despite the fact that the stability of operation and durability of an organisation’s 
procedures and structures are motifs in the theory of organisation from the very 
beginning. It may be interpreted from the first concepts of F. Taylor, K. Adamiecki 
or H. Fayol’s postulate of safe organisation. Nevertheless, as a practical matter the 
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challenge only began to be formulated during the IT revolution of the late 1970s 
and 80s. Then the first institutions achieved a high enough level of business 
computerisation to begin to notice the dependence of their image in the eyes of 
customers and their economic performance on the smooth operation of IT systems. 
This source of the modern perception of the problem of business continuity as 
uninterrupted service contributed to the development of consultancies in this field, 
and to the formation of several major centres working on the recommendations 
of business continuity best practice. The best known are: 
  The American Disaster Recovery Institute International (The Institute for 
Continuity Management), est. 1989,
  The UK Business Continuity Institute, founded in 1994, 
  The American Virtual Corporation, established in 1994,
  The Asian Business Continuity Management Institute network, developed 
since 20052.
Their activity consists of commercial consulting, developing their own stan-
dards of recommended procedure, training linked to the granting of certificates of 
qualification, integration of specialists in the field by offering electronic and tradi-
tional forms of exchange of experiences and meetings, and publishing guidelines 
and case-studies for particular areas of business and administration. These commu-
nities are also supported by groups of entrepreneurs especially interested in the 
development of such recommendations. The leaders of these projects are usually 
also involved in academic teaching related to training in business management.
The second stream of the development of the concept of providing business 
continuity includes the work of standardisation committees, particularly in Australia 
and New Zealand, Singapore, the USA and the UK. It is also characteristic that 
the aspects of business continuity emerge in the course of work on the elaboration 
of standards of service, security, and crisis management. This is observable in the 
ISO 20000 series of standards ISO 2700x, ISO 31000, ISO 22301m or ISO 22313. 
This is similar in the case of the Basel Committee.
From the above review, it can be shown that there is a renewed need to re-
emphasise the difference in the perception of risk from the perspective of the 
scientific disciplines of economics and finance and the discipline of management. 
In economic and financial terms, the point is primarily to determine the appropria-
te level of resources necessary to fund the effects of the actualisation of the risk. 
These resources cannot be too small, but it would also be unreasonable if their 
level was too high, and so research has focused on methods of as accurate as po-
ssible modelling of this level. In terms of management theory, the focus is to a 
much greater extent on more organisational aspects. Firstly, in terms of preventing 
the materialisation of the risk, and secondly in planning the organisational respon-
se in the event of its materialisation. This means that you need a thorough know-
ledge of its essence in the sense of the threat mechanism and the context of its 
2  See www.bcm-institute.org, www.drii.org, www.thebci.org, www.virtual-corp.net
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occurrence associated with resource and organisational determinants of the activi-
ties of a given organisation and its environment. Of course, the two takes – econo-
mic and financial, and management – are complementary in the search for the best 
understanding of the nature of risk and its actualisation and the selection of re-
sponse. In relation to reaction, the financial approach is, however, static and pas-
sive, while organisational solutions for ensuring business continuity are 
characterised by dynamics and the flexibility to adapt to a particular situation 
which is a consequence of the materialisation of the event.
Increasing scientific knowledge, especially with regard to the paradoxical de-
lays indicated above in formulating scientific findings regarding the operational 
and organisational principles of operational risk management in terms of business 
continuity, inclines to the view that there is a need to give this issue more intensive 
reflection and research from the perspective of management sciences, which hi-
therto has virtually not happened. An important question is siting of the issues of 
the Operational Risk – Security – Business Continuity triad in this discipline, i.e. 
whether and to what extent it belongs, and to what extent it lies outside. The discus-
sion shows that this triad is an important part of management theory and there is 
an urgent need to permanently formalise its system of concepts, the rules of conduct 
within its framework, and the rules for managing it.
2. Risk 
2.1. Risk and uncertainty
To date, the concept of risk has been ambiguous because of the multiplicity of 
interpretations given to it over the years. For a very long time the meaning of this 
word was associated on the one hand with “uncertainty”, and on the other with 
„accident” and “hazard”. Serious attempts to clarify the concept of risk were un-
dertaken during the 19th-century development of a new, in economic and political 
terms, society. This model, after further evolution, obviously, operates to this day3, 
and a socially important role in it is given to institutions which, although known 
much earlier, have only in the new economic situation reached the status of parti-
cular social significance and responsibility, i.e. banks and insurance companies. 
Today, they are international – like the European Union – and national financial 
systems, whose stability is the condition of both local and global economic balance. 
These systems and their significance arise from the social need to manage risk, 
which is after all the essence of the operations of financial firms. Their approach 
has also been transposed to other industries, and furthermore the non-financial 
aspect of risk is beginning to be perceived. Hence the need for continued research 
and ever more precise definition of risk and isolation of its types. 
Given the extent of the issues covered by this concept, current knowledge 
about risk has become a comprehensive and multi-layered theory. On the one hand 
it formulates generally accepted and unquestioned basic premises, such as the 
inseparable connection between risk and activity. On the other, however, it is divided 
into a number of related trends including among:
  areas of economic activity (banking, insurance, capital market, industry, 
trade, etc.),
  the perspective of individual social sciences (especially sociology, psycho-
logy, economics, finance, and management),
3  In this study, no efforts were made towards a strictly historical argument. Both the conditions 
of the modern economy and banking or insurance were available in some countries – for example in 
the UK – already in the middle of the 18th century. A popular presentation of the development of thinking 
about risk can be found in [Bernstein, 1996].
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  the mechanism for the creation and realisation of risk (the different appro-
aches and classifications of risk in this approach are outlined in section 2.2).
In the history of philosophy, there is also the view that awareness of risk is 
one of the conditions for the beginning of the modern era in terms of the birth in 
people of a sense that their future can be shaped by they themselves, and is not just 
a fate imposed by the supernatural4, and therefore human free will faces a future 
that is difficult to foresee, which henceforth it now has to shape alone. This points 
to the need to properly define an issue that is very similar and often identified with 
risk, i.e. uncertainty. Risk is, after all, born of uncertainty in action.
The issue of uncertainty has two main perspectives: traditional (deterministic) 
and modern. In the history of philosophy, the earlier one, uncertainty in human 
action and prediction of phenomena, especially physical, referred to man’s limited 
knowledge of the world about him. With this approach, it could be stated that 
uncertainty is the incompleteness or imperfection of human knowledge and the 
effect of limited human cognitive capacity [Wust, 1937]. 
Deterministic views, whether in the field of life and physical sciences or 
abstract philosophy, have ultimately been confounded by the scientific discoveries 
of the 20th century. The new view of physical phenomena (spacetime theory, wave 
theories, quantum mechanics, and nuclear physics) changed the concept of uncer-
tainty, henceforth interpreted as relativity and duality of physical phenomena, 
and the discontinuity of matter and energy. From this perspective, uncertainty is 
a feature not only of human perception and an expression of its infirmities, but 
simply a feature of the physical world, quite apart from the quality of human per-
ception. As a philosophical interpretation of this new perspective on nature, in 1926 
Heisenberg formulated his uncertainty principle. 
Although uncertainty as a philosophical category is non-measurable, in a ge-
neral sense to some extent it expresses entropy, especially when uncertainty refers 
to changes in an object subjected to be some organisational action, the results of 
which are anticipated with a certain probability of materialisation.
Given the approaches of philosophy, physics and the social sciences, it should 
be emphasised that this uncertainty is understood as:
  an organic feature of reality resulting from the randomness of phenomena, 
of which even the most stable should only be considered as occurring with 
extremely high probability, but not with complete certainty,
  a peculiar imperfection associated with incomplete perception by the human 
observer of elements shaping the phenomenon.
At the same time, due to the fact that reality (nature) is seen through the 
prism of human activity, uncertainty can be defined as active or passive. Passive 
uncertainty (objective) is not shaped by the individual; it is a feature of reality. 
Active uncertainty concerns the human mind.
4  However, to this day the concept of uncertainty is seen philosophically, also from the theological 
point of view, which is expressed by the aphorism of St. Augustine - "If you could understand it, it would 
not be God”.
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A similar notion is unpredictability; however, this refers to the result of a specific 
event or very explicit action, while uncertainty expresses the general state of 
inability to accurately determine a course of action and the probability of each 
variant of the result.
2.2. Types and classifications of risk
Risk arises when in conditions of uncertainty we undertake a deliberate action, 
i.e. a string of deliberate acts, and at the same time an ongoing series of decisions, 
inextricably linked to the nature of the action. Moreover, the emergence of the 
knowledge of risk, including that we identify in the context of an action and its 
decisions, affects the further course of action, which now, next to the goals, should 
be characterised by efforts to reduce, offset or postpone the risk. This creates a kind 
of loop of behaviours, whose root cause is integral uncertainty.
So far, the concept of risk issues proposed in 1921 by Knight [1957] has not 
been properly challenged. Nevertheless, we have failed to clarify this concept satis-
factorily, and nor have we been to formulate a universal definition of risk. This is 
primarily because the perception of risk is strongly dependent on the perspective 
of the affected party. At the same time, these are not all the conditions relativising 
the perspective of risk. In causal terms of rather than in terms of effect, we can 
speak of an objective definition of risk, since in this approach the mechanism of its 
formation is studied and we can accurately describe its characteristics. In contrast, 
from the perspective of effects, risk is perceived more subjectively, because the 
same event can give rise to effects with different consequences for different stake-
holders, even of similar profile and position.
Initially, research on risk was only conducted in particular segments of the 
financial market, i.e. in insurance, banking, and the capital market. It was initiated 
here because the financial market is precisely called upon to deal with risk; it is 
the business of operators in this market. They accept their various types of risks from 
their clients (e.g. related to insuring the client, accepting their deposits, granting 
them loans, etc.) and manage them, grouping them by type (defined in specific 
financial products), while dispelling their own risk due to the significant number 
of customers. These entities do business from accepting the risk of others and play 
an important social role in doing so. At the same time, financial businesses expe-
rience risk in running their own business, in which they are no different from other 
businesses for which risk is only an element which impedes the planning and conduct 
of business.
On the substance of the issue of risk, for all businesses, and more generally 
all organisations, the degree of importance of risk in their business is decided upon 
by further aspects, such as [Beck, 1986]:
  the business planning horizon – the further away it is, the greater the degree 
of unpredictability associated with risk,
  experience as knowledge of specific forms of risk – the higher, the more 
possible it is to use statistical analysis tools to determine the risk,
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  instability of the environment, understood in many dimensions, from the 
geographical (e.g. areas particularly vulnerable to natural disasters) via 
economic, legal, and political,
  The business impact of some types of risks that are often also the source 
of its other types.
Reflecting on the wording of the definition of risk, we need to be aware that:
  it is heterogeneous,
  it occurs both in of objective and subjective aspects,
  it can be seen in different contexts (intrinsic characteristics, situations of 
manifestation, types of activities of parties experiencing it),
  it is variable and is affected by many factors (in part dependent and in part 
independent of the parties experiencing it),
  it is more a process than a state.
This leads to the conclusion that – beyond a single general definition – it is 
perfectly natural to use a number of detailed definitions. Their diversity results 
from both through a defining lens, and so its subjective perception, as well as from 
the specifics of the type of activity, which risk touches and through which it is 
sometimes created.
Such a general definition is:
The risk R is the product of the probability P of a disruptive event occurring and the size 
of damages S resulting thereof5.
R = P · S
The author’s observations, made over the course of years of research on ope-
rational risk, lead to the conclusion that in ongoing economic activity there is no 
need for a universal definition of risk, which various types of risk are determined, 
both in broad terms, as well as for individual markets or sectors of the economy, 
as well as in the system: organisation’s environment versus its internal arrange-
ment and operation. An example would be credit risk in banking and non-banking 
commercial relations, in their ideological mechanism the same, but still seen as 
different with regard to the scale, concentration, dispersion and time horizon.
Searching for a classification of risk useful for projects in the field of business 
continuity, the author has also concluded that the major difficulty in classifying 
types of risks is due to the need to take account of the causes of its formation (causal 
view), the method and process of its actualisation (view from the perspective of 
vulnerability) and manifestations of its materialisation (effect view). And here we 
are not even considering so much the subjectivity of the assessment of the realisa-
tion of the risk. The main difficulty is constituted by the complicated relationship 
5  Such a definition is proposed by the USA Commission on Insurance Terms, 1966, and also 
[FERMA, 2003].
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between the organisation and its environment, hence the need to assign both 
causes and effects to the environment or to the organisation (its operations). 
In the author’s view, all of the following combinations are possible (with the proviso 
that the first two are the most common):
  a cause in the environment, and an effect within the organisation – for 
example, lowering the profitability of production due to an increase in 
the value of the national currency,
  both cause and effect within the organisation – for example, the downtime 
caused by employee error,
  a cause within the organisation, and an effect in the environment – for 
example, appearance of a product defect during its use by the purchaser,
  both cause and effect in the environment (although of course there is here 
a mechanism for the impact of the effect of risk on the organisation and its 
activities) – e.g. depletion of the market as a consequence of geographically 
distant natural disaster.
Other significant features of the different types of risks that should be taken 
into account when considering the general classification of the risk are:
  time of occurrence of the cause to the effect,
  the size of potential or actual damage,
  the disorder of the damage (interference) again in several aspects, such as: 
value of the losses, the time required to restore the original state (if at all 
possible), the nature of the consequences (physical, geographical, social, 
organisational, etc.)
  repeatability (the frequency of materialisation) of this type of risk and the 
damage resulting from it,
  the predictability of the risk (knowledge of statistical regularity of occurrence, 
the range of possible scenarios of actualisation and the possible consequences).
Well-established and uncontroversial classifications of risk are limited to finan-
cial risk, broken down into four market segments and the entities operating there 
that face such risks and in a similar way take account of them in their management 
practice. These are: banking, insurance, the capital market, and other economic 
agents. In banking, the classification introduced by the global recommendations 
of Basel II has been effective since 2006. In insurance in the European Union the 
Solvency II Directive will soon apply. In the capital market of the European Union, 
a set of MiFID directives have been introduced since January 2007, which divide 
risk in the same way as banking regulations, putting additional emphasis on the 
risk of speculation in derivatives.
For other entities, i.e. manufacturing, trade and service enterprises, considered 
to be the separation and definition of market risk, credit risk and liquidity risk are 
undisputed. Other risks and their classification have not been agreed in a widely 
accepted model. Probably the consequence of this is that in this case the risk divi-
sions are not determined on the basis of pre-defined criteria for classification. 
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Particularly interesting is the fact that operational risk, so clearly already highlighted 
in the case of financial institutions, is still not perceived seriously here.
In many papers, fragmentary classifications are given relating to individual 
criteria, such as: perspective (internal or external) of assessment by the company, 
type of activity and membership of the industry/sector/type of market, the need 
for, or value placed on the risk, type of threat, ability to protect against, time horizon 
(business planning, the consequences of protection, the impact of dangers, etc.) 
and many others. Until recently, the state did not interfere with practice, because 
outside the financial market, where risk is the subject of the business, it was almost 
a marginal issue in management. Today, however, due to the increasing level of orga-
nisational complexity in all social activities, organisations are consciously undertaking 
to manage business risk and use it in creating and building value. Risk is even 
becoming one of the central challenges in business management. 
The traditional approach was limited to a simplified analysis of the organisa-
tion’s activities and treated risk as an insignificant issue in management. In the 
majority of cases, risk management amounted to the preparation of preventive 
measures against dangers which might cause losses, and the opportunity was not 
taken to build lasting added value in the organisation. In addition, it did not 
provide consistent and systematic methods for risk management, which for most 
organisations is important in the context of the increasingly frequent need to define 
new and existing types of business risk.
Thus, the need for a comprehensive look at risk as a structured multi-threaded 
image of issues has become increasingly important. In response, various attempts 
are ongoing to capture this issue [Nocco, Stultz, 2006; Strzelczak 2003] – covering 
these is beyond the scope of this book. 
2.3. The concept of comprehensive risk classification
In this study, a different, original suggestion towards research will be indicated. 
It is based on the consideration of two aspects of the analysis of the issue. The first 
is the logical sequence starting from the causes of critical events, via the mechanism 
of their actualisation, to the final actualisation, or effects, which are usually damages 
and losses (see Fig. 2.1). Risk is, in fact, recognised by:
  dangers, which constitute the causal image of the risk
  the interaction of these dangers with vulnerabilities in the business that 
experiences the risk, which constitutes the essence of the materialisation 
mechanism of risk,
  the effects of risk materialisation.
It is therefore a combination of a causal approach, a mechanism for actuali-
sation, and an effect approach, with the aim of capturing the dynamics of over-
lapping critical events which embody a business risk. And these elements should 
be taken into account when setting a comprehensive classification.
2.3. The concept of comprehensive risk classification 31
Figure 2.1. Cause and effect model of risk classification 
The second aspect of the analysis is to integrate the various divisions of risk 
with its types, carried out from the perspective of the various areas of social activity 
and bodies operating in their area. Such divisions should be made separately 
in terms of causation, and separately in the terms of the effect. Figure 2.2 shows, 
in the form of a cross section, only the idea of  classification, which requires careful 
examination and clarification. This classification must connect:
The division of risk types specific to industries, sectors and areas of socio-
economic activity,
  the division into risk of the body’s internal and external risk,
  the division into specific and systemic (systematic)risk  
  and it should be open to other, more detailed breakdowns.
For example, consider as a starting point the division of financial risks as 
categorised by Culp [2002] while of course reviewing the criteria for the division:
  market risk,
  financing risk,
  market liquidity risk,
  credit risk,
  legal risk.
After these considerations, it is also worth defining business risk by adopting 
a radical division of general risk perceived by the organisation into business and 
operational risk. Such a division is justified in Chapter 5 as the distinction between 
the concept of activity (which relates to business risk) and the concept of action 
(which in turn relates to operational risk, as discussed in Chapter 3). Thus: 
﻿
Causal view (classification according to danger)
Effect view (classification according to disruption)
Materialisation view
(classification according  
to vulnerability)
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Business risk can be defined as the risk of losses due to inappropriate decisions about 
the selection of clients, form of products and services, or obligations to business partners 
or as a result of failure or inconsistency in a country’s economic system. 
Figure 2.2. Structural model of risk classification 
2.4. Risk measurement 
First of all, we should note the often unfairly overlooked division of risk metrics 
into objective metrics, characterised by the risk itself, and subjective metrics rela-
ted to the relationship of the organisation and, indeed, its decision makers, to risk. 
In the practice of risk management this is a very important difference, because 
regardless of the calculation of risk through the use of selected methods for me-
asuring, the risk values  finally adopted in the course of decision-making as part of 
managing them are derived from the subjective response of the decision-makers.
Universal social risk
Universal financial risk
Entity’s  
operational  
risk
Sector risk
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2.4. Risk measurement 33
As part of the systematisation of risk metrics, we should include:
  decomposition of risk metrics in the direction of determining the probabi-
lity of the results of individual events endangered by risk and the value of 
those results;
  the degree of multi-dimensionality of the risk being considered;
  the need to consider extreme risk (catastrophic in nature and with a huge 
level of losses).
Risk metrics, from the perspective of the design and nature of a given measu-
re, can be subdivided as follows:
  metrics based on the statistical distribution of a random variable, which is 
a risk variable (the effect of the risk is subject to analysis, illustrated by the 
possible values of the risk variable);
  metrics resulting from the dependency of the risk variable on risk factors 
(what is, in fact, analysed is the cause of the risk as the effect of the risk 
factor on the risk variable);
  measurement data in the form of classes of risk, and thus the risk variable 
is not necessarily a random variable, the semantic differential method (only 
the effect of the risk is analysed) is the most commonly used.
The general approach is characterised by Figure 2.3. This issue is rapidly 
expanding, especially in the search for analogies with other areas in economics.
It should be stressed, however, that the financial measurement methods with 
respect to operational risk are mainly for the determination of the capital adequacy 
for the risk, and thus the level of financial security which the organisation needs 
to be able to face the consequences of the different types of risks affecting its acti-
vities. Except where the risk relates to financial resources, this is not a metric for 
the risk itself, but only for defining the necessary reserves. Consider this in these 
examples taken from economic life. 
The first example concerns the financial resources and the issue of security. 
Assume that an organisation is preparing to participate in a tender procedure, 
counting on a multi-million dollar contract. A condition of participation is to pay 
the deposit, a few per cent of the value of the potential contract. If we consider the 
risk of loss of the amount in the deposit (theft, denial of bank guarantee), should 
the risk should be measured by the amount of the deposit or the amount of the lost 
contract with an as yet unknown exact value? Is it necessary to make this value 
precise or is it sufficient to say that it is significant? And as a consequence, special 
remedial solutions will be necessary to protect against its loss.
The second example relates to non-financial resources and business continuity 
issues. An organisation is paralysed as a consequence of heavy snowfalls; workers 
cannot get to the workplace, and components cannot be received and finished 
products dispatched. The only solution is to engage all available forces in the orga-
nisation of human and technical resources to unblock routes of communication. 
The risk of such an event should obviously be calculated financially, but on the other 
hand, an assessment is required which will indicate that the decision to mobilise 
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forces and means is justified. This need not be financial, but simply an indicator, 
i.e. yes or no.
Figure 2.3. Risk measurement - approaches, methods, techniques 
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This means that in terms of mitigation of operational risk, and thus ensuring 
organisational security and business continuity, it is necessary to adopt a different 
way of thinking. This issue is developed in subsection 4.2.
2.5. Risk management
The primary objective of risk management is to improve the financial performance 
of the company and provide conditions such that it does not incur losses greater 
than assumed. Management should lead to the situation where the organisation 
(its management) is aware of the risk and its dimensions, and current activity do-
es not go beyond the risk consciously adopted as acceptable. Influencing the risk 
must take into account the existence of opportunities and risks, and the ability to 
cover potential losses, where losses seen as profits lost from not taking certain 
actions must also be considered.
For a long time, risk has not been systematically analysed outside the financial 
sector, where for natural reasons it is the leitmotif in the development of insurance, 
banking and capital markets’ products and services. However, the growth of wealth 
of societies in the second half of the 20th century led to increasingly frequent recourse 
to insurance products, and at the same time a growing awareness of the possibility 
of securing business from the basic types of risk. To the end of the 20th century, 
an integrated approach to enterprise risk management was perpetuated, also closely 
associated with the analysis of the processes occurring within it, and with the postu-
late of the security of management, which also included the protection of reputa-
tion and business continuity [Strzelczak, 2003].
In terms of the conditions of effective management, it is a detailed analysis and 
recognition of the nature and extent of the potential risk, as this allows selection 
of actions in a timely manner for moderating or preventing negative effects. 
We should aim for the situation where an informed decision can be taken as to the 
limits of permissible exposure to the risk, in the context of the potential achievement 
or loss of benefits in business. Hence: risk management strategy is a plan of action 
for important areas in the organisation, depending on the formulation of objectives 
and forms of action referred to the anticipated changes in the factors affecting the 
level of probability of loss of benefits or losses. This should constitute a planned 
response to risk, formulated on the basis of knowledge about the sources and me-
thods of its materialisation in the form of damage and based on knowledge of how 
to prevent and measure risk, and valuation of the damage, i.e. its effects. 
You can never eliminate risk entirely; you can only seek to minimise it. The risk 
that remains is called residual risk. As a rule, further minimising of the risk is eco-
nomically unjustified, i.e. the cost would be greater than the potential loss. However, 
we should be aware of the likelihood of occurrence of an incident that is an expression 
of such a minimised risk. The organisation should be aware of the existence of 
residual risk and the need for an informed decision about accepting it.
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Modern risk management refers to a division into the following basic groups 
of risk: material threats, financial threats, strategic threats and operational threats, 
and also adopts the following six principles of management.
1. Enterprise risk management should be management of all its modes simul-
taneously.
2. The risk management process must directly involve the company’s top 
management. 
3. General enterprise risk types should be treated as a risk portfolio – which 
means that it requires an understanding of its individual elements and the 
relationships between them – and must be managed via the objectives and 
processes across the organisation [Casual Actuarial Society, 2003].
4. Quantitative methods of measuring risk should be applied. 
5. Tools and risk management procedures adopted are common to all types 
of businesses. 
6. Risk is not so much minimised as optimised, and enterprise risk manage-
ment becomes the decision-making and implementation of activities to 
achieve an acceptable level of risk. 
Specific types of risks emerged at the turn of the 21st century as a result of 
pathological management in certain corporations: Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International – 1991; Maxwell Corporation – 1991; Enron – 2001; World Com – 2001; 
Parmalat – 2003. In response the corporate governance rules were introduced6, 
and within them the principles of supervision and monitoring. Three pillars of risk 
control serve this end: 
  ownership discipline (i.e. disciplinary measures which are available to 
a company’s owner),
  market discipline (and thus disciplinary measures against the company 
available to market participants),
  regulatory discipline (and thus the means public authorities have against 
the company to enforce the security of specific behaviours).
To properly manage risk, company management must understand that the 
most important steps are: its identification, analysis, and measurement (or estimate). 
Until this happens, it is hard to speak specifically about a risk, because you cannot 
properly take measures or security solutions to limit the risk. In general it can be 
said that, without knowing the risk, one can only deal with the danger understood 
primarily as: ignorance, recklessness, and negligence. When due diligence in ac-
tion is added, we are no longer speaking about a vague danger, but about a risk as 
the likelihood of a specific effect or as a distribution of likelihoods imagined as a 
set of consequences. Then you can decide which methods of management to cho-
ose (to neutralise it) and build the relevant organisational structure.
6  E.g. Polish Forum Corporate Governance www.odpowiedzialnybiznes.pl, European Corporate 
Governance Institute www.ecgi.org
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The growing importance of enterprise risk management has meant that since 
the end of the 20th century public standards of risk management have arisen. These 
were created as the result of initiatives by a number of institutions that promote 
best practice in managing varieties of risk. Among them, special attention should 
be paid to the standard recommended in 2004 by the Committee of Sponsoring 
Organisations of the Treadway Commmission – known as COSO II – Integrated 
Enterprise Risk Management [Nocco, Stultz 2006]. COSO II is based on eight 
elements of integrated risk management, which largely correspond to those 
previously developed from internal control standards (known as COSO I). 
1. Internal environment – risk management policy within the organisation, 
specifying, inter alia, its tolerance for risk and recognised ethical values.
2. Goal setting – a system of risk management which provides the company 
leadership with processes for setting goals and verifying compliance with 
the company’s mission and its propensity to/tolerance of risk.
3. Identification of events/threats – establishing the internal and external 
events that may affect the achievement of planned objectives.
4. Risk assessment – above all, risk analysis, and within this determining 
the likelihood of its occurrence and the possible scale of impact, which 
aims to determine ways to affect risk.
5. Response to risk – the basic approaches to risk, such as: avoidance, acquisi-
tion, reduction or breakdown, and actions to influence risk according to 
the established tolerance levels.
6. Control – control policies and procedures for verifying the degree of imple-
mentation of risk management programs.
7. Communication – the range of information and forms of communication 
between employees.
8. Monitoring – a systematic assessment of degree of task realisation to achieve 
an adequate resistance to risk.
In turn, in its enterprise risk management standard of 2003, the Casualty 
Actuarial Society of the United States (CAS) defines this management as “the 
process of assessing, controlling, operating, financing and monitoring risks from 
all sources for the purpose of increasing short-and long-term organisational values 
for stakeholders” [Casualty Actuarial Society, 2003]. The CAS model distinguishes 
4 types of risk:
  the risk of threats (physical), including the risk of civil liability, property 
damage, and natural disasters,
  financial risk, including valuation, assets, currency and liquidity risk,
  operational risks, including the risk of customer dissatisfaction, failed 
product, fraud, loss of reputation,
  strategic risks, including the risk of competition, social trends, and capital 
availability.
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The CAS management process model consists of 7 steps:
1) determining the context of the organisation’s activity in terms of risk,
2) risk identification,
3) risk analysis and classification,
4) developing a comprehensive portfolio of risk,
5) assessing (estimating) and prioritising risks,
6) the effect on the risk of adopting appropriate action plans,
7) monitoring and control.
Also in 2003, FERMA (the Federation of European Risk Management Associa-
tions) recommended a standard of risk management developed by a group of 
the UK’s largest sector organisations: IRM (The Institute of Risk Management), 
AIRMIC (The Association of Insurance and Risk Managers) and ALARM (The National 
Forum for Risk Management in the Public Sector). This Standard uses the termi-
nology adopted by the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) in 
the document “Recommendations of ISO/IEC Guide 73 – Vocabulary – Guidelines 
for standards”. This Standard [FERMA, 2003] distinguishes between internal and 
external risk factors and divides risk into: financial, strategic, operational and 
dangers, and the risk management process into 7 stages: 
1) determining the company’s strategic objectives, 
2) risk assessment, 
3) risk information, 
4) decision to address the risk,
5) affecting the risk, 
6) reporting of residual risk, 
7) monitoring. 
The most difficult of these is risk assessment, which includes its identification, 
description, and measurement. The Standard attaches great importance to reporting 
and communication in risk management, as well as to the proper organisation of 
managing it.
The above principles in relation to operational risk are developed in Chapter 2.
2.6. Risk management maturity level assessment
At the end of these considerations, let us consider the question of the efficiency 
and maturity of the risk management process. The basis of modern management 
systems is a process approach. This is based on the belief that the intended action 
is carried out with proper productivity when it is treated as a process. Ongoing 
productivity achieved and its improvement are assessed by measuring the process 
parameters. This must lead to a comprehensive measurement of the effectiveness 
and productivity of the process. Every process, and thus also the risk management 
process.
2.6. Risk management maturity level assessment 39
Measuring the effectiveness and productivity of a process is one of the man-
datory assessment tools7 in quality management systems. And risk management, 
especially as a result of the management of the provision of security and business 
continuity management, are procedures for the quality assurance of this action.
Measurement and evaluation of the processes are carried out under monitoring 
and constitute an integral part of them. The basic elements of the assessment are:
  the ability of the process to perform the tasks (including validation of the 
ability after any significant change in the process or its environment),
  flexibility (as the ability to change),
  effectiveness,
  productivity,
  efficiency and others.
Most important for the overall assessment are the indicators of effectiveness 
and productivity. Effectiveness and productivity are considered to be detailed cate-
gories of a universal praxeological concept – efficiency (things are done well), 
which is measured as the ratio of parameters delivered to those planned (e.g. yield) 
of a process and determines the degree of utilisation of resources. Within the context 
of efficiency, the measurability and accountability of its goals are essential issues. 
They should primarily be characterised by such features as: precision, measurability, 
prioritisation, comprehensibility, feasibility, and availability.
Effectiveness (good things are done) – is measured as the ratio of parameters 
completed to planned of process productivity, and determines the ability to achieve 
the desired objectives. This is about the ability to select appropriate goals, without 
which even smooth operation is pointless. Productivity, on the other hand, is the 
relationship between results achieved and resources used. Effectiveness and pro-
ductivity can be seen as results of the quality of a process, and this means that the 
quality of the process as a synonym of the original capacity is primary to effective-
ness, productivity, and flexibility. The emphasis recently placed on assessing the 
flexibility of a process stems from the frequent impacts of the environment, which 
force an internal change in the organisation.
A schema for assessing the effectiveness and productivity of a process involves 
[Rummler, Brache, 2000]: 
  managing the process objectives,
  managing the process productivity,
  managing the process resources,
  managing at the interface between the activities.
This schema consists of the following phases and steps to determine the measures 
that allow the assessment process:
7  Other assessment tools include: internal audit, assessment of user satisfaction, assessment of 
objectives, and management review.
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  phase of determining the requirements and objectives of the process
 – identifying the requirements and sources of process goals,
 – analysis of the essence of these requirements and their transfer to the 
level of the process,
 – setting objectives for the process;
  phase of designing the metrics and monitoring system
 – establishing the process metrics,
 – defining the responsibilities and tools for measuring and monitoring;
  phase of registering and evaluating the process results
 – registering process parameters,
 – accounting of the process metrics,
 – interpreting the results achieved,
 – deciding on necessary corrective actions.
The metrics for assessing a process apply to activities and the manner of their 
execution. They are divided using two criteria. According to the position of obser-
vation (setting the value of the metric), for:
  external metrics that measure the productivity of the process,
  internal metrics that measure the efficiency of the process.
In turn, by category of data used to construct metrics for:
  metrics of economic productivity, which express the assessed aspect of the 
process in monetary values,
  operating productivity metrics that reflect the efficiency state of the pro-
cess and may be quantified.
Metrics serve systematic monitoring, carried on traditionally or using techni-
cal tools. Always, however, the limiting aspects of the effectiveness of the evalu-
ation will be:
  the need for anticipatory ideas on the effects of disruption that have not 
yet happened, and estimating the cost dimension;
  estimating the potential maximum loss suffered as a result of disruption 
which, although it occurred, its dimensions were limited by the use of so-
lutions providing security and business continuity;
  ongoing interpenetration of routine workflow solutions with solutions 
aimed at ensuring security and business continuity.
A special form of process measurement is statistical control, whose importan-
ce is emphasised by ISO 9001, and which in the past was more often used on 
processes in industrial plants. Meanwhile, the latest concepts [Armstrong, 2001] 
suggest that – preserving the condition of proper selection of parameters – using 
statistical control we can analyse any process. In addition, this is the subject of 
recommendations promoted in the banking and insurance branches of the finan-
cial sector (recommendations of Basel II and EU Directive Solvency II), that induce 
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organisations to run statistical databases on incidents and to build on that basis 
internal (i.e. specific to the organisation) management models for different types 
of risk, including operational risk, with the implication that the following will be 
assured: quality, security, and business continuity.
Level I
Traditional approach
– internal monitoring
– internal audit
– individual prevention programmes 
– based on organisational culture and human resource quality 
Level II
Awareness
– risk definition
– risk policy
– risk assessment
– warning signals
– risk management structures
– commencement of data gathering about events
– economic capital models
Level III
Monitoring
– vision and goals of operational risk management
– comprehensive risk indicators
– risk limits
– reporting
– engagement of operating personnel
– training
Level IV
Quantification
– database of operational damages
– measurable quantitative goals
– prediction models
– economic capital including risk
– active risk committee 
Level V
Integration
– integrated set of management and operational tools 
– risk analysis integrated with management of the entire company
– correlation of risk indicators and operational losses
–  assignment of risk (insurance) linked to analysis of the level of 
risk and capital
–  remuneration of managers dependent on company results 
corrected for the value of the risk 
Figure 2.4. Levels of risk management maturity 
Source: [BBA, ISDA, RMA, 1999].
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The assessment carried out on the basis of metrics is to lead to arrangements 
for the further improvement of the process. This should be done using a process 
maturity test, for example, according to Armstrong’s model [2001], which intro-
duces a five-step scale for maturity level:
  preliminary – the results of the process are characterised by volatility,
  repeatable – the process achieves reproducible results,
  defined – the process is efficient and effective, consistent with the criteria,
  directed – the process is highly efficient and effective,
  optimised – the results achieved are of the highest quality.
Similarly, the maturity of comprehensive risk management can be assessed. 
An example of such an evaluation model is shown in Figure 2.4. 
The use of this type of model is based on an initial assessment of the level 
currently achieved and the development of a plan (and its controlled implementa-
tion) for improving risk management in order to achieve the next levels, which is 
verified by periodic assessments of compliance with the model. Especially emphasised 
should be the need to include risk management rules (including security rules) 
in the shaping of the organisational culture and the need for full involvement of 
all employees in the organisation (not just those participating in the risk manage-
ment structures).
3. Operational risk and its classifications 
3.1. The problematic triad “Risk – Security – Business 
Continuity” 
Operational risk in terms of providing business continuity is related to the question 
of the time horizon over which the planned action is considered and the accom-
panying risks and associated threats. This is significant because of the ques tion 
– on the basis of which scientific discipline is the nature of the risk and providing 
security and business continuity being considered? This should be carried out diffe-
rently if you are look from a distant time horizon – then it is a question of the scope 
of the discipline of economics, for which in the context of business continuity such 
issues as the following are important: the economic cycle, growth (development) 
and its saturation and possible achievement of the growth boundary (e.g. the hypo-
thesis that the economic model of the European Union is perhaps coming to the 
end of its development). 
On the other hand, if you take a short time horizon, it is a question of the 
scope of the discipline of management science, and operational risk is considered 
the risk of insufficient effectiveness of operation from the perspective of the opera-
tional (ongoing) goal of this action. And it is just such an approach that is the 
subject of this book. In this approach, operational risk is the possibility of failure 
of technical expectations, productivity or qualifications, as well as intentional 
criminal damage. It is therefore about how internal organisational processes are 
sufficiently effective, including resistance to disruption, as to enable the organisation 
to meet its objectives. There is no automatic synergy between the two areas, namely 
the business and the operational activities of the organisation. We can, in fact, 
imagine a situation where a company, after designing an attractive product and 
finding the appropriate category of recipients, is not able to meet the challenge of 
producing or delivering this product to customers as a result of ineffective (in any 
aspect) organisation of production, sales or logistics in the broad sense. This may 
be a purely organisational problem, but might also be a lack of qualifications in 
personnel, shortage of funds, etc.
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The logical consequence of awareness, identification and assessment of risk 
is the search for security and remedial solutions. In particular, it is worth empha-
sising the synergistic relationship between the issues of security provision and 
business continuity. From the perspective of tasks assigned to ensuring business 
continuity, all actions aimed at security are preventive. On the other hand, from 
the perspective of safety and security, business continuity solutions are a remedial 
reaction to the ineffective protection. This is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1. Relationships between the tasks of providing security and business continuity 
An integrated perspective on operational risk, security and business continuity 
may be the key to integrating modern management concepts, because, as pointed 
out in the introduction:
  analysing the risk explains the reasons for the limited predictability of a given 
activity,
  determining security methods shows how to increase this predictability,
  ensuring business continuity reflects the desire for full capability with regard 
to difficulties in activities undertaken.
  the triad Risk – Security – Business Continuity entails the management of 
risks involving the rational spread of emphasis between prevention against 
threats to the organisation’s activities and the planned response to the pre-
sence of disruption.
In fact, using the concept of operational risk management includes the control 
of the triad of issues Risk – Security – Continuity.
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3.2. The existing approach towards operational risk
The issue of operational risk was taken up in the 90s of the twentieth century by 
the Basel Committee in the preparation of comprehensive recommendations 
on good risk management practices in banking. The momentum with which 
these recommendations have been introduced in entities on the financial market 
(such as Basel II and the Solvency Directive), and the precedence of the work of 
the Basel Committee over other studies on this issue, has resulted in the absorp-
tion of the Basel Committee’s definition and classification in the scientific field. 
It should be critically stressed that this classification was developed as a summary 
of banking practice and in the scientific sense has methodological flaws.
This definition, from the point of view of the science of organisation and 
management, needs assessment of:
  the differences between the concept of “operational” and the potential 
concept of “operative”,
  the catalogue of issues (and its clear boundaries) that comprises operational 
risk.
Operational risk should be seen as an issue related to the efficiency of an 
organisation. For this reason, in order to assess the definition proposed by the Basel 
Committee, we should appeal to the classical management scheme (Fig. 3.2).
Figure 3.2. A conceptual model of management 
While the economic risks associated with the functioning of the organisa-
tional cycle are addressed to the goal of the organiation’s activities, operational risk 
concerns how resources are used in the organisational cycle to achieve the objective, 
and is therefore subject to the requirements imposed by the management of eco-
nomic risk.
Considering the alternative use of the terms “operational” or “operative” we 
can actually refer to operationalism as a direction in the methodology of science, 
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according to which scientific terms and concepts have empirical sense when they 
can be defined by the description of the operation defining their use. The adjective 
“operating” is thus to mean “relating to the operation”, i.e. actions to perform 
a specific task in the way of logical and planned transformation (of resources) 
conducted within the organisation. In turn, the adjective “operative” in its very 
root, signifying vigorous, efficient and effective action, is attributed to all ongoing 
activities in an organisation, making it a broader concept than term “operating”, in 
particular in the relationship with the environment. At this point, it is worth returning 
to the consideration of the difference between activity and action (see chap. 5). 
Both action and operability are specifically associated with the handling of resources, 
while activity and operationality are related to the comprehensive functioning of 
the organisation. In conclusion, it must be assumed that the term “operational 
risk” is framed and interpreted in the Basel Committee documents in accordance 
with the methodology of management science, which does not mean full acceptance 
of abovementioned definition.
With regard to the problems listed in the Basel Committee’s definition of 
operational risk we should refer to the appropriate analytical approaches for operat-
ional management, i.e. the process approach and the interaction of an organisation 
with the environment. In this context, we should evaluate not only the definition, 
but the classification of categories of events (7 categories) and event types within 
each category, which are its source of interpretation or generalisation. This classi-
fication unfortunately mixes manifestations of risk in terms of causal and effect 
relationship, and therefore does not meet the basic requirements of scientific classi-
fication, i.e. clarity and consistency of criteria. Therefore, in the rest of this book, 
an original classification of the types of operational risk is proposed.
In the literature analysing and describing risk there are different risk classifi-
cations, but the issue of operational risk itself is considered rather marginally, 
hence the few attempts to classify this type of risk. This is not accompanied by 
a methodological outlining of the limits of the issue, nor a methodical formulation 
of the criteria for classification. 
Interesting contributing work worth mentioning is C. Pritchard’s book [2001]. 
It is an example of how operational risk issues are viewed in many areas of the 
professional literature. They are devoted to other leading problems (in Pritchard, 
management of IT projects), for which risk is an important factor in success or 
failure. From the perspective of such issues as projects in Pritchard, the issue of 
risk is then presented specifically and incompletely. The term “risk” does not even 
bear the adjective “operational”, and that this is the subject can only be learned 
from the description of the manifestations of the risks that are considered. To a 
greater extent than on manifestations of risk, and therefore, indirectly, its types, 
such works are focused on clarifying the process of managing the basic problem 
area (in Pritchard – design), and only in the second step to add elements of risk 
management to the process.
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3.3. Proposed perspective according to organisation 
theory
As a consequence of the defects in the Basel classification, we can also see the defects 
in the definition. The risk factors articulated suggest intentions, which in the light 
of the theories of organisation and management should be recognised as follows:
  certain internal and external events are possible which disrupt an organi-
sation’s activity, i.e. impair the operation of processes,
  processes are to a certain degree and extent susceptible to disruptive 
events,
  certain resources are critical for the maintenance of processes,
  an organisation may bear legal responsibility for the consequences of disrup-
ted processes or resources.
It should also be stressed that as a result of the classification of the Basel 
Committee category of events, features of these resources may lie at the founda-
tion of disruptive events. This applies especially to the specificity of human reso-
urces, and the complexity of IT systems and the dependence of many processes on 
these resources and systems.
A new definition should take these elements into account, i.e. the importance 
of certain processes (maybe not all, but certainly the critical ones) with the reco-
gnition of the vulnerability of the resources needed to carry out these processes, 
either in the context of external and internal threats to effectively reduce or stop 
the execution of certain processes, or result in property damage and legal respon-
sibility for such events and their effects. The proposition for a more precise defini-
tion (kept similar to the existing) reads:
Operational risk is the risk of material and reputational loss and legal liability resulting 
from inadequate or failed processes and their essential resources (personnel, material, 
IT and financial), and the disruption emerging as a result of the impact of internal and 
external threats.
As a consequence of such a definition and in relation to the considerations of 
the Basel classification, there is an evident need to make a systematic classification 
of risk. The author’s proposal is presented in tables8 3.1 and 3.2. The proposed 
classification criteria refer to three elements of risk manifestation:
  the character of the individual processes implemented in the organisation,
  the types of threats that may disrupt those processes,
8  The classification given in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 is the author’s major contribution to the science, 
in addition to establishing the BCM rules against the backdrop of the principles of operational risk 
management. 
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  vulnerability to threat: the organisation of processes and the different types 
of resources necessary for carrying out these processes9.
The issue of the processes included in the classic division of basic, auxiliary 
and management processes [Dahlgaard, Kristensen, Kanji, 2004]. At the same ti-
me, processes in general are treated as a representation of the internal factors of 
an organisation, supplementing them with a category of external factors related to 
the organisation’s impact on the business environment.
In this arrangement, the threats – as manifestations of risk – potentially act 
on the organisation as a whole (and are then recognised as factors acting from the 
outside, i.e. from the environment) or on specific categories of processes (primary, 
auxiliary, management).
With regard to the impact of the environment on the whole organisation and 
in relation to fundamental processes, taking account of threats and vulnerabilities, 
comprehensive risk types have been indicated. Of course, when considering 
the situation of a particular organisation, some of these risk types may not exist, 
either because of the trivial importance of the threat or because of immunity to it. 
For example, a software company running a data service centre (outsourcing service) 
cannot be exposed to the risk of power failure due to its having a spare source in 
the form of an electric generator driven by liquid fuel.
However, in relation to auxiliary processes and resources, it has been assumed 
that these processes rely on resource sharing by the organisational units conducting 
the basic processes. Similarly, it has been assumed that management processes are 
based on a specific value added to the resource which is the internal organisation 
of the company, and so to the organisational structure and the ordered relationships 
between units at different levels and their positions.
The issue of an organisation’s vulnerability to risks in relation to auxiliary 
and and management processes referrs to the postulated attributes of the ideal 
system: effectiveness, productivity, rationality, safety, and repeatability.
The different types of operational risks identified in Table 3.1 are further 
characterised in Table 3.2 in the description system:
  the nature of the causes of a given type of risk,
  the mechanism by which it actualises, 
  The type of effects that such a risk causes,
  typical examples of the effects.
The description is designed to be helpful in targeting research on different 
types of operational risk and practical identification of the areas and disciplines 
which can help to manage it.
9  Detailed characteristics of the materialisation of risk in the form of process disruppion as inter-
actions between threats and an organisation’s vulnerabilities are discussed in Chapter 5
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Table 3.2. Characteristics of types of operational risk
Causes Materialisation mechanism Effects Examples
Risk of natural disasters
Natural Described by the natu-
ral sciences
From natural (changes in 
the environment), through 
social, to focused on indi-
vidual entities or locations
• earthquake
• flood
• hurricane
• extensive fire
•  torrential rain, hail, 
snow
Risk of terrorism
Social and psycholo-
gical
Described by the social 
sciences
From social to focused on 
individual entities or loca-
tions
• assault, kidnapping
• blackmail
Risk of external functional interference in the work environment
External to the orga-
nisation, and often 
un known to the orga-
nisation
Without direct connection 
to the normal activities 
of the organisation, but 
cutting it off from exter-
nal links
Non-destructive limitation 
of normal activities
•  lack of access to the 
premises
Risk of internal functional disturbance of the work environment
Negligence in relations 
and working conditions
Breaking of internal rela-
tions (between the units 
or stations) determining 
processes in the orga-
nisation
Non-destructive limiting the 
of the capability for full im-
plementation of the normal 
functions of the organisa-
tion
• strike
• employee accident
Risk of disrupting the physical environment
Scarcity of safeguards 
against factors impact-
ing on the working 
environment
Exceeding the tolerance 
limits
Limitation on normal ope-
ration for workers or equip-
ment with special require-
ments
•  Too high a tempera-
ture because of the 
weather
•  Too high a tempera-
ture due to technical 
failure
Risk of disrupting the technical environment
Wear or hidden defect Progressive deteriora-
tion of quality parame-
ters or a sudden excess
Limitation on normal ope-
ration
• equipment failure
Risk of disrupting the IT environment
Similarly as above, concerns specific cases of technical risk associated 
with IT systems
• computer failure
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Causes Materialisation mechanism Effects Examples
Risk of lack of competence
Poor selection of em-
ployees for tasks or 
worker lags behind pro-
fessional challenges
Unprofessional assess-
ment of premises for 
action or decision-ma-
king
Misleading actions or de-
cisions about the legal, 
physical, financial, or re-
putational effects
•  unknowingly incorrect 
or hasty action by an 
employee
Risk of lack of reserve personnel
Improper planning of 
tasks and resources
Gradual or sudden ex-
haustion of necessary 
personnel
Inability to fully perform 
tasks
• unexpected absence
•  inability to perform 
all tasks
Risk of staff turnover
Inadequate working 
con ditions, inadequate 
assessment of the si-
tuation on the labour 
market
Employees searching 
for another place of 
employment
Inability to ensure the qua-
lity, dimension or efficiency 
of work conducted
•  unexpected resignation
•  changes in personnel 
more frequent than 
the period required to 
master the tasks in 
the workplace
Risk of relativism of interpretation
Lack of clear commu-
nication, or lack of 
information
Actions initiated from 
position that is objecti-
vely relevant, but run in 
an inappropriate direc-
tion or manner
Activities inadequate to 
objective circumstances
•  unknowingly incorrect 
or hasty execution of 
a command
Risk of employee ill-will 
Ethically wrong choice 
of appropriate workers 
for jobs
Utilisation of the jobs or 
insufficient protection / 
control over actions 
contrary to the interests 
of the employer
Loss of property or repu-
tation in the employer’s 
business
•  deliberately incorrect 
activity by an employee
•  misappropriation of 
entrusted funds
Risk of routine (ossification)
Long-term performan-
ce of the same tasks 
or activities
Gradual shaping of re-
flex action
Reflex action in a situation 
that requires a special 
procedure
•  driver driving “by heart” 
in spite of changes in 
traffic rules
Risk of lack of functionality
Boundaries of the func-
tionality of the organi-
sation 
Inability to perform a new 
task, apparently similar 
to previous
Inability to carry out a task •  acceptance of an or-
der which at some 
stage of execution 
cannot be continued
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Causes Materialisation mechanism Effects Examples
Risk of lack of material reserves 
Improper planning of 
tasks and resources
Lack of resources already 
detected during the exe-
cution of a task
Inability to carry out a task •  unexpected lack of 
components in pro-
duction
Risk of side effects
Insufficient knowledge 
of the context of the 
task
Activity causes additio-
nal and not necessarily 
immediately evident ad-
verse effects
Material or reputational 
losses and liability for the 
losses of third parties
•  unexpected deleterious 
effect of planned ac-
tivities
Risk of wear
Limited durability of 
individual resources
Consumption of resour-
ces leading to exceeding 
the tolerance limits
Inability to carry out a task •  loss of parameters in 
the manufacturing de-
vice 
Risk of inappropriate spending
Insufficient competence Incorrect assessment of 
decision-making evidence 
Losses as a result of wrong 
decisions
• misguided investment
Risk of overspending
Insufficient competence Incorrect assessment of 
decision-making evidence 
Excessive level of expen-
diture
•  error in trade nego-
tiations
Risk of exhaustion of funds
Improper planning of 
financial tasks and 
resources
In the course of opera-
tion financial resources 
are depleted without 
being able to properly 
replenish them quickly
Loss of liquidity • Inability to purchase
Risk of lack of full content
Lack of competence 
or lack of access to 
appropriate sources of 
information
No information in the 
course of action taken 
requiring such informa-
tion
Inability to carry out a task •  Incomplete design do-
cumentation
Risk of lagging behind development 
Lack of competence 
or deficiencies in the 
update of information
No information in the 
course of action taken 
requiring such informa-
tion
Inability to carry out the 
task or performance under 
conditions of incomplete 
information
•  Investment project in 
an area that has just 
been designated for 
other purposes
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Causes Materialisation mechanism Effects Examples
Risk of unavailability of information
Lack of access to ap-
propriate sources of 
information
No information in the 
course of action taken 
requiring such informa-
tion
Inability to carry out the 
task or performance under 
conditions of incomplete 
information
•  Unavailability of infor-
mation from market 
competitors
Risk of distortion of information
Lack of sufficient com-
petence
Incorrect interpretation 
of information
Bad or limited-quality per-
formance
• Economic Forecasts
Risk of incident (failure)
Vulnerabilities in or-
ganising activities or 
resources of the or-
ganisation
Interaction between thre-
ats and proper opera-
tion with vulnerability 
Inability to maintain current 
organisational operation
•  Failure of the produc-
tion line
Risk of a lack of organisational capacity
Lack of sufficient com-
petence in the field of 
organisation and ma-
nagement
Improper planning of 
tasks and resources
Inability or limited ability 
to carry out the task
•  Disruption in a com-
plex project
Risk primacy of security over effectiveness
Excessive literalness 
in the interpretation of 
rules and best practice
More and more careful 
adherence to formal ru-
les leading to limitation, 
and even paralysis of 
the action 
Inefficient operation • “Work to rule” 
Risk of absences
Improper organisation 
of activities (including 
inappropriate resour-
ces)
Activity is unstable, im-
precisely organised, uses 
uncertain resources
Results do not achieve 
the expected quality para-
meters
• Defective product
4. The process of operational risk management
By analysing its operations, you can specify what an organisation does. “Operations 
are the activities which comprise all the activities directly related to the production 
of a product, which can be tangible goods or services” [Waters, 2001, p 20]. Opera-
tions are arranged in the processes. A process in terms of a logical organisation 
sequence of consecutive steps, or parallel, which leads to meet the customer’s 
expectations, both internally and externally, by providing them with a product, 
service, consistent with its documentation requirements.
Operational management focuses on the manner in which an operation is 
performed. “It is the function of management responsible for all activities directly 
relating to the manufacture of a product: for the collection of the various initial 
components and processing them into the planned final products” [Waters, 
2002, p 32].
It should be emphasised that the common notion – operative management – 
is something else. This refers to the term “operative”, which means vigorous, effective 
and efficient action. Operative management refers to ongoing activity and therefore 
includes not only operationally transforming the resources into products/services, 
but also the development of other aspects of the organisation. 
4.1. Risk management organisation 
Operational risk management is directly related to the functioning of the organi-
sation and the processes comprising its activities. Manifestations of this risk are an 
ongoing subject in management, regardless of the awareness of this on the part of 
executives. In the case of an organisation’s established processes, it may even be 
found that managing operational risk is one of the main tasks of management, as 
the management in this case is mostly dealing with exceptions/deviations from 
the planned actions or incidents. Accordingly, operational risk management, more 
than in the case of other risk groups, is integrated with the management mechanism. 
Therefore a serious dilemma arises in respect of this – whether and how much 
operational risk management should be excluded from general management and 
made an autonomous process. This has been the subject of numerous studies by 
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the author. In particular, analysis of the practices of the financial sector (in terms 
of operational risk serving as a close analogy to other economic sectors), where 
there is a presrciption requiring that dedicated risk management be separated in 
a framework for determining capital adequacy in terms of risk, this indicates 
that operational risk management is carried out in two streams. The first – general 
– is difficult to separate from the observational aspect of ongoing management. 
Within its framework, issues and problems are solved that are the consequences of 
materialising risks. Management activities are routine reactions, analyses of the 
situation, evaluations and decisions. However, they are more effective, the more 
powerful is the second stream of operational risk management. It is autonomous 
in character and associated only with this type of risk, based on the task structures 
(time dedicated), it operates intervally (periodic work). The first stream compared 
to the second relies more on intuitive and situational actions. The second is focused 
on in-depth analysis and the development of solutions precisely relating to the risk. 
It is most beneficial when the first stream derives from the second. Further consi-
derations apply to the second trend.
Risk management covers:
  the establishment of a dedicated task force or organisational structure with 
specific tasks and competencies,
  definition of the applicable rules for carrying out risk issues, based on the 
general recommendations (e.g. industry-wide like Basel II) or internal 
experiences of a given issue,
  a set of methods and measures to control the impact of risk factors on the 
functioning of the organisation and used for this purpose in making rational 
decisions.
In terms of the institutionalisation of the risk management function, it is 
important to define the role of employees and management. All levels of the orga-
nisation, i.e. employees, managers, directors, management board and supervisory 
board, should have responsibilities associated with the risk management system. 
In this way, the base may be prepared to allow the active participation of the orga-
nisation’s employers and management in operational risk reduction. These condi-
tions are shown in Figure 4.1. 
The division of responsibilities between the different levels, organisational 
units and employees is as follows. The Supervisory Board and the Management 
Board should:
  know about the most important types of risk to which the organisation is 
exposed,
  know the potential consequences of deviations from the assumed indicators 
for the value of the company,
  ensure an adequate level of awareness within the organisation,
  know the extent to which the organisation is prepared for crisis
  be aware of the importance of trust in the pressure groups for the orga-
nisation,
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  comply with the principles of communicating with the environment,
  receive information about whether the risk management process is func-
tioning properly,
  present a clear risk management strategy, including the concept of opera-
tions and the division of duties.
Figure 4.1. The risk management system 
Organisational units should:
  be aware of the threaets that exist in the business, and for which they are 
responsible, and their potential effects on other areas of the business, as 
well as the potential consequences events in other areas may have for 
their own activities;
  have indicators that will enable constant examination of the key economic 
and financial results and progress towards the goals, and to identify issues 
that require intervention;
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  to have systems that indicate deviations from the budget assumptions or 
forecasts often enough to be able to take appropriate action,
  systematically and promptly inform top management of any new risks or 
improper functioning of the measures applied.
Employees should:
  understand their responsibility for a given risk type,
  know how they can contribute to the continuous improvement of the risk 
management process, 
  understand that risk management is primarily awareness of the threats,
  systematically and promptly inform top management of any new risks or 
improper functioning of the measures applied. 
The condition for the effectiveness of risk management is the use of a process 
approach (Fig. 4.2) and its full integration with all management processes and 
support of risk analysis from interdisciplinary knowledge of its causes, mechanisms 
and consequences [Conrow, 2000]. Additional verification of the correctness and 
effectiveness of the identification of risk factors, determining the level of risk and 
neutralising it, and finally its management, is provided by an interim audit, in 
principle compatible with any conventional rules of improving the organisation’s 
internal control, and within the risk management model constituting a form of 
control feedback which enables a spiral process of improvement. 
Figure 4.2. A functional model of risk management 
Source: [Conrow, 2000].
In practice, individual risk management activities are interwoven, and it should 
be remembered that this process is not separate from other management processes, 
but strongly integrated with them. With this in mind, risk management can be 
divided into stages and steps, which is also needed to ensure the functioning of the 
risk management process on a spiral of improvement [Loader, 2006, pp. 123-125].
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Stage I – Risk assessment:
  risk identification,
  risk analysis,
  estimation of risk,
  prioritisation of risks.
Stage II – Active approach to risk (also referred to as affecting risk or mani-
pulation of risk):
  elimination of (avoiding) risk
  risk reduction (including prevention),
  risk segmentation,
  risk division,
  risk transfer,
  risk financing,
  (in some cases) risk toleration.
Stage III – Risk Monitoring
  social approach focused on threats to humans,
  economic approach focused on the efficiency of the organisation,
  systematic inspection,
  risk control.
4.2. Risk identification, analysis, and assessment
In risk management, the most important aspect is accurate and complete identifi-
cation of the types of risks faced by the organisation and its activities. Then comes 
careful analysis, and estimation. The desired situation is to have statistics with 
adequate credibility, describing the distribution of the occurrence of disruptive 
phenomena. In a situation where there are no such statistics, there remains esti-
mation of the risk factors. It should be emphasised here that a body with high orga-
nisational culture, regardless of the requirements of supervisors, from its own beliefs 
collects and analyses statistical data concerning the organisation of work and its 
conditions of operation. This is also a specific element of the organisation’s knowledge 
management. 
In broad terms, the analysis of operational risk is initiated from a strategic 
assessment of the susceptibility of the most significant business activities, known 
as critical, to threats. This assessment is referred to as the BIA (Business Impact 
Analysis) [Charters, 2011], and begins by identifying key processes and their 
particularly critical elements and factors that may adversely affect that criticality. 
For each critical business process, a BIA provides mainly the following information:
  the amount of potential financial losses presented cumulatively over a time 
interval (it is assumed that the organisation should know the estimated 
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value, determined mainly on the basis of past experience, the losses incurred 
on the basis of lost benefits for every hour of downtime, plus additionally 
a divided threshold for periods of abrupt increase in these losses);
  the level of potential losses uncountable over a uniform scale for all processes 
(it is assumed that the organisation should strive to evaluate the branding 
losses and estimate their value on the basis of lost profits in the long term);
  the maximum allowable duration of interruption of a process – in other 
words, the time after which the process must be restarted for the establi-
shed acceptable level of quality (it is assumed that the organisation’s deci-
sion-makers, through study, should specify this requirement in relation to 
the then draft business continuity solutions, keeping in mind that this also 
implies a certain level of spending on these solutions);
  the minimum functional level of process restoration – in other words, an 
acceptable established level of quality to resume the process after a failure 
(this is not synonymous with the restoration of the original level of quality);
  the time after which the process must be restarted at its established accep-
table level (it is assumed in this case that the organisation’s decision-makers, 
through study, should specify this requirement in relation to the then draft 
business continuity solutions, keeping in mind that this also implies a certain 
level of spending on these solutions);
  the specification of the resources necessary to maintain the efficiency of 
critical processes, called the Minimum Acceptable Configuration.
In the context where the organisation’s management approves the findings 
of the BIA, we can proceed to the analysis of risk much more effectively oriented 
towards business areas already identified as crucial for the organisation. This analysis 
is based primarily on the identification of risk types, and more and more there is 
talk of the identification of the types of threats, assuming that a threat is a mani-
festation of a risk specific to certain conditions of the organsation’s activity. 
The purpose of this identification is to use a number of methods and techniques, 
such as checklists, interaction diagrams, process and systems mapping, and records 
of incidents and events, expert assessments, and creative and scenario methods. 
Risk analysis should lead to the most precise possible definition of the nature 
of the identified risk types, and an indication of the types of threats that are the 
expression of risks in the specific terms of the organisation. In particular, the 
description of the nature of the threat/risk should refer to their causes (sources), 
the mechanism of materialisation (including the organisation’s vulnerability) and 
the effects (Figure 2.1 and the accompanying description). 
At this point it is worth looking back to the point at which section 2.4. finished. 
The point is that the vast majority of types of operational risk (see Tab. 3.1 and 3.2) 
are non-financial in nature.In such cases, the methods of analysis, and in particular 
the methods of risk measurement involving financial estimates, are of limited use. 
Above all, they do not serve as a direct measurement of risk, and only the determi-
nation of capital adequacy as the level of funding that the organisation should 
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have to bear the financial consequences of the actualisation of risks. Therefore, the 
methods that are suitable for analysing operational risk are mainly qualitative 
(descriptive and qualificative). This is because the nature of these risk types is 
multifaceted and each lead it to a common denominator, popularly speaking, that 
is, the search for one metric of assessment, and this is either impossible or leads to 
far-reaching simplification. This is an important argument for the use of qualitative 
methods, descriptive in the analytical phase and qualificative in the estimate phase. 
In this situation, consideration should be given to the value of those qualitative 
methods, which often are treated as being of “inferior quality” to quantitative 
methods. Recently there has been an effective argument indicating that these alle-
gations are unfounded. The author of this work agrees with this view, relying on 
arguments related to the teleological interpretation of the methodological approach 
in the analysis of operational risk. The fact is that, of course, it is important to know 
the size of the corresponding financial reserves to meet the potential negative 
consequences of risk materialisation, but this is only of passive relevance. Active 
confrontation of the risk requires preparing solutions against its impact, on policies 
limiting its intensity, and on activities providing the ability to rapidly remove the 
effects of risk materialisation. For the preparation of such solutions and actions, 
first a description of the essential elements of the phenomena that make up the 
risk formation and risk materialisation is needed. Then, however, in relation to 
risk assessment, it is necessary to identify the individual eligibility rules for the 
threats, and the established ranges for qualifacative ratings: point (such as 0-1-2-3 
or 1-3-5-9), percentage, or semantic (e.g. large-medium-small or destructive-non-
destructive). This does not mean rejecting a priori quantitative assessment methods, 
such as statistical methods, which promote the recording of incidents (breaches of 
normal activity) and use of the data contained within this register from the moment 
the threshold set by the statistical reliability is crossed [Help-desk, 2007]. Qualifi-
cative ratings allow you to determine the kind of assumed risk approach that 
should be applied to the risk according to its assigned interval assessment. In practi-
ce, management usually provides sufficient reasons for the decision as to the selection 
of security solutions and corrective actions. Typical types of methods of analysis 
and qualitative evaluation are presented in Table 4.1. They all have the basic 
drawback of limited quantitative estimation; in practice, however, with regard to 
operational risks the benefits outweigh these drawbacks.
An example of the estimation method specially developed for operational 
risk is TSM-ORA (Total Security Management – Operational Risk Assessement)10. 
The first steps for analysis in this method are:
  defining the system boundaries within which the resources are to be found 
(it is assumed that the analysis does not necessarily apply to the entire 
organisation, but then you must indicate which organisational units and 
which processes are to be included),
10  This method was developed in 2004 at the Technical University of Warsaw (with the leading 
participation of the author of this work) at the request of UNIDO as part of its project for support the 
management with material facilities in the Polish police force. 
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  describing the environment – both physical and legal and organisational 
– in which the system works (in particular, it examines how the level of 
efficiency of the processes is required and where the metrics of that efficiency 
come from),
  defining the assets to be indicated by the analysis process, which are the 
assets that determine the smooth running of processes (business continuity 
violations come directly from the unavailability of resources or their services 
for the process).
Table 4.1. Types of qualitative methods in risk analysis 
Types of methods Usefulness 
Descriptive risk assessment
If there is no well-established practice of analysing risk, then using this 
method can make a systematic description and try to develop a basic 
opinion as to the seriousness of the risks/threats (e.g. large-medium-small). 
Risk factor catalogue
If the type of risk/threat is well described as to its nature, it is possible 
to for the organisation to prepare a template identifying the individual 
characteristics of the risk /threat and assigning them an interval evalu-
ation. The more these characteristics are examined, however, the harder 
it is to determine the total or resultant value of such an assessment.
Profile analysis
A risk profile of the organisation is prepared, which is a list of analysis 
sections (characteristics of the organisation), and an assessment of the 
degree of risk in relation to individual sections (features) is conducted.
Early warning systems
These examine the critical factors for a given risk/threat and determine 
the thresholds of vulnerability which can be regarded as warning signals, 
or examine the characteristic symptoms of the materialising threat.
Risk equalisation (mostly loss 
compensation)
The different types of risks/threats are studied in order to identify those 
that should be affected to reduce their level to the specified acceptable 
levels.
Risk assessment adapted 
from FMEA
Explores the causal relationships of the actualisation of risks/threats 
and identifies the key factor in the criticality applying the traditional use 
of this method in quality analysis.
This analysis comprises a determination of the objectives and functions of the 
system of action, which should ensure the availability of assets; then the determi-
nation of the processes performed by the system, and pursuing its objectives, and 
finally identifying the resources (including intangible assets) that make this possible. 
Assets should be assessed in terms of characterising their validity in the light of the 
objectives of the system. The values  of the evaluation should be based on the cost 
of obtaining and maintaining the assets. 
The next step is to identify threats. This analysis depends on determining 
which of them actually relate to the system being analysed and the probability 
with which they may occur. This probability may depend on the type and value of 
the assets of the system of action, subject to individual threats. The evaluation of 
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this susceptibility of such resources can be accomplished in two ways. The first is 
to develop a list of weaknesses in the system, i.e. its vulnerabilities that could be 
exploited by potential threats, and then an estimate of their ease of use. This tech-
nique is difficult to the extent that the weaknesses in the system of operation only 
usually come to light when disruption is experienced. A sufficiently reliable asses-
sment is therefore possible in this case only on the basis of statistics of incidents 
which in practice have rarely taken place. The second method is to start from the 
identified threats and assess how vulnerable individual assets are to them. When it 
comes to interaction between threats and the system, as a result of a vulnerability, 
we are talking about disruption. The crown of the risk analysis process is to develop 
a map of the potential disruptions, which is formed by a combination of the analysis 
and evaluation of two factors: the probability with which a disruption may occur, 
and the impact it will have on the system of operation.
It is also interesting, and possible to use on the basis of analogy, to use risk 
analysis for technical systems, such as event tree analysis, fault tree analysis, and 
threat exploration and operational readiness studies.
4.3. Influencing and monitoring risk
Influencing the level of risk, aimed at limiting it, and consisting mainly of introducing 
security solutions must maintain business rationality. Therefore, except in cases of 
solutions strictly required by the law, we are looking for a compromise between 
expected losses, associated with the effects of the materialisation of the risk, and 
expenditure on security solutions. The remaining unprotected scope of risk is 
called residual. 
Even residual risk justifies the development of business continuity plans. 
Furthermore, the unreliability of the introduced security solutions needs to be con-
sidered. This is the second significant reason to prepare business continuity plans.
For these reasons, the relationship between security solutions and the business 
continuity solutions supporting them is derived from the business assessment of 
the situation by the organisation’s decision-makers. Additional rationality for such 
an assessment is based on the fact that a risk is also an opportunity and taking it 
provides competitive business opportunities.
The consequence of risk analysis is to conduct work on providing security 
and business continuity that can be achieved by looking for solutions that affect 
the manifestations of risk. These issues, which constitute Phase II of the risk 
management process [Loader, 2006], are discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.
Operational risk management is carried out by the adoption of various criteria 
for assessing the materialisation of its purpose – from minimising the risk of the 
assumed effect on activities to maximising the effect at a given level of risk. This is 
accompanied by planning/accounting of management activities, effect and moni-
toring of risk, both in the direct sense and by providing the resources necessary to 
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act on the risk. As part of the planning, all these activities should be budgeted, 
reported, evaluated and improved. 
Managing them requires appropriate knowledge of all the aspects of the iden-
tified risks, such as: their causes, mechanisms, and symptoms of actualisation, 
the possible location of disruptions, their potential scale, observation techniques, etc. 
Due to the fact that operational risk is primarily concerned with the unavailability 
of resources, and these are of every possible kind, the monitoring of the individual 
elements of the description of risks, threats and potential disruptions is very exten-
sive, requiring different methods and techniques relevant to the specific resources 
recognised as critical or the specifics of how they are used. As described in relation 
to the methods of measuring operational risk, there is also the issue of what is to 
be subject to monitoring, and this usually features some resource or characteristic 
way of using it. This feature is usually a physical or technical (material resources), 
psycho- or sociological or skill-based (personnel resources), technical and cognitivist 
(IT resources), organisational (how to use the resources), and very rarely economic 
and financial (financial resources). With regard to the principles of monitoring so 
prepared and corresponding to the resources, procedures are laid down for extra-
ordinary notification of a risk actualisation based on the assumed signals/parameters: 
acceptability, early warning and emergency, and procedures for adherence to busi-
ness continuity.
In addition to an organisation’s operational risk management, what is im-
portant is not only the risk of a single critical event, but the overall risk map con-
sisting of all possible critical events. This allows you to determine the overall risk, 
particularly the risk of probable events, the domino effect (risk accumulation) or 
particularly severe risk events. Therefore, risk monitoring should be carried out 
comprehensively and continually improved, which means that this is an issue 
typical of knowledge management. Management of risks is largely derived from 
the accumulation of knowledge in the sense of the ability to collect information, 
selecting that which is important, and drawing conclusions from it (signals) in order 
to take appropriate preventive and remedial action. This hides entire complexes of 
issues that are associated with separate sets of competencies (know-how), which 
in turn should be appropriately associated. This book has already mentioned as an 
example the flooding of the Oder – since the event in 1997 the monitoring system 
in that area has been expanded. It has been improved both in terms of information 
gathering techniques and methods of analysing them, but also in the efficiency of 
the services which should react by bringing aid. 
In this broad context, it is difficult to give specific guidance as to methods of 
monitoring. They must be matched to a specific problem according to the rules 
and disciplines of a given scientific discipline and the specific occupations and 
characteristics of the economic sectors involved in it. However, it is worth showing 
a general model for building such a monitoring system based on knowledge and 
skills management.
There are several approaches to knowledge management, their authors and 
supporters attempt to create the belief that a rigorously uniform approach is possi-
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ble to such management, indicating one of these approaches. In opposition to this, 
the author, on the basis of practical experience, is convinced of the possibility and 
the need for simultaneous use of several approaches, combined on the basis of 
the layers seen by analogy with the 7-layer OSI model of network services in ICT 
[ISO 7498-1]. This construction of an integrated knowledge management system 
allows relatively separably – i.e. in a coordinated manner but in different orders, 
at different times and by separate groups of people – solution of organisational, 
process, resource, or personnel policy issues. Building a layered integrated approach 
(Tab. 4.2) moves from the organisational layer to the layer of intellect (the ima-
ginary sequence of layers must be interpreted from the bottom of the table to the 
header). In each of them, a different classical approach to knowledge management 
should dominate.
Table 4.2. Layers and formal approaches in integrated knowledge management 
Imagined layer Prevailing approach
Intellectual layer 
(socialising knowledge, the relationships of people and 
the interpretation of content)
Behavioral approach
Content layer 
(areas of knowledge, from overt to covert knowledge)
Resource approach
Operating layer 
(knowledge disclosure, collecting, codifying, sharing and 
management)
Process approach
Organisational layer 
(strategy, structure, audit)
System approach
The organisational layer defines issues of organisational structure dedicated 
to knowledge management – so formally separate (dedicated organisational units) 
and task forces (working groups, task, ad hoc, temporary, implementation, etc. 
forces), or completely informal groups – and the roles (dependencies), the powers 
and responsibilities for purposes in this layer designated to knowledge management 
goals. Primarily, features of the system approach are used here, particularly the 
definition of principles: creation, codification and transfer of knowledge, which 
are used to determine the goals of knowledge management.
The operational layer determines the structure and the implementation of the 
knowledge management process. Primarily, characteristics of the process approach 
are used here, because this is the way to implement the principle of continuous 
improvement, and capture the element of the dynamics of phenomena characteristic 
of modern management. In addition, this approach assumes that knowledge mana-
gement is measurable. This is achieved by the decomposition of a management 
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process into three related spirals of improvement (collection, codification and 
sharing), each more homogeneous in terms of the nature of action. Their task is to 
gather knowledge according to need, formulating knowledge in a user-friendly 
form, relevant from the organisational point of view and the operational use of 
knowledge already accumulated. The convention of spirals of improvement provides 
an ongoing compromise between needs and capabilities. 
The content layer defines the resources of explicit knowledge and certain kinds 
of clues pointing to hidden knowledge. Here, we primarily use characteristics of 
the resource approach, which is considered to be the most traditional in knowledge 
management, but its main value is related to the fact that it corresponds directly 
to the tasks determined at the level of strategic management. In this approach, 
knowledge is considered to be the company’s most important resource. Thus, it is 
seen as: key competencies, key skills, the ability to solve problems in teams, the 
ability to acquire knowledge from the environment, the implementation of new 
tools, experimentation, etc. 
The intellect layer mainly uses the behavioral approach, which serves to 
socialise knowledge, i.e. operating, provoking, stimulating and supporting know-
ledge transfer, as pure knowledge is created in people’s minds and develops in 
relationships between them.
Practical differences in knowledge management between different areas of 
knowledge show up with an intensity increasing with the order of the layers, espe-
cially at the level of the layer of intellect, which in some areas of knowledge need 
not appear. At the level of the organisational layer, a joint task organisational 
structure of knowledge management is constructed across the enterprise and the 
relationships in force within it. At the process level a mechanism is built of three 
spirals of improvement. The level of content in the case of certain areas of knowledge 
might in fact be the last. This applies for example to strictly technical knowledge 
in which the use of knowledge is often based on the use of professional knowledge 
in a very instantiated form. The intellect layer takes on importance, where operational 
activities are naturally variable, difficult to standardise, based on the mechanisms 
of accumulation of individual experience/skill that requires difficult synthesis, also 
difficult to describe in general, and even more difficult to codify.
5. Ensuring security in the management 
of operational risk 
Security. This term, like risk, is not unambiguous. In the context of risk management, 
security is a particular social and subjective state, limited to a single organisation 
or sector of related organisations. It is a social good in terms of human needs, 
human values and human rights. From a societal perspective, proper to crisis mana-
gement11, it is seen primarily as a value. 
According to Maslow’s classic study [1954], a sense of security is the second 
basic human need. Therefore, it is true that “the objective of crisis management is 
not only the fastest return to normal. The essence of this type of management is to 
force the organisation to be aware of its moral and social responsibility to internal 
and external stakeholders, to society, and even to the world” [Mitroff, Pearson, 1993]. 
Ensuring security is the prevention of threats, as it comprises solutions, whose 
primary goal is to prevent critical situations by perceiving threat factors, monitoring 
characteristic and typical symptoms of their activation, and preventing their inter-
action with the organisation’s system of action and its environment. If these measures 
fail and there is a disruption of organisational activity, it comes time for planned 
and organised remedial activity, which should provide an acceptable ability to 
maintain business continuity.
5.1. Security in terms of resources
In the practice of operational risk management, a significant influence is maintained 
by the strong association of this risk with the organisation’s resources. Their defi-
ciency, too little availability or poor quality are, in practice, organisational activity 
perceived as a threat, whereas the certainty of these resources at an appropriate 
11  It should be noted that in this work security is referred to as a risk as seen from the perspective 
of a single organisation. There is, in parallel, perception of risk and security from a social perspective, 
which is defined by the concept of crisis management. 
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level and of an appropriate quality is seen as a sign of security. The intuitive percep-
tion is that security is associated with a type of resource, and this is often reflected 
within the organisation – operational risk management is divided into two catego-
ries, namely classical and modern areas of ancillary management in the organisation. 
The first category comprises: physical and technical protection and personnel security. 
These issues have long been studied by the organisation theory. For these areas it 
is fully justified to speak of recommended best practices. With this, the perspective 
on physical and technical security is marked by specifics of the industry in which 
a given entity operates, while personnel security, as the effect of a personnel policy, 
is a universal issue, similar in any organisation, and, therefore, uniquely supported 
theoretically and by an equally rich literature. The second category comprises: 
information and IT system security, and ensuring business continuity. In this case, 
due to the new issues, there are different views at the question, and consequently 
different concepts of threat analysis and search for solutions. 
It is worth noting that, with the establishment of the principles of systematic 
management of operational risk, equally established are the terms “resource security 
management”, “operational security management”, and over the full scope “total 
security management” (TSM).
Ensuring security implies solutions whose primary goal is to prevent situations 
by perceiving threat factors, monitoring characteristic and typical symptoms of 
their actualisation, and preventing their interaction with the organisation’s system 
of action and its environment. If these measures fail and there is a disruption of 
organisational activity, the time comes for planned and organised remedial activity, 
which should provide acceptable business continuity.
Influencing operational risks, i.e. the organisation’s responsiveness to an iden-
tified risk, may rely on affecting its causes, its materialisation mechanism, or its 
effects. Such action takes place in the context of the essence of the risk itself and 
the capability to act on it, and in the context of the organisation’s ability to undertake 
such an act, whether this be in terms of disposal of the relevant measures/tools, or 
the appropriate skills. Such a situation is generally positively dynamic, i.e. achieving 
better and better cognition of the risk and the practice of impacting on it by an orga-
nisation’s experience, which enhances the effectiveness of risk mitigation. Of course, 
this applies only to the types of risks with sources within the reach of the organi-
sation’s impact, and with an intensity and scale of impact commensurate with the 
organisation’s capacity to respond.
The impact on critical events as manifestations of risk may relate to the causes 
of these events (prevention as ex-ante procedures) or to their effects (ex-post 
therapy). Contrary to appearances, this does not assume an automatic superiority 
of preventive over corrective action. The evaluation and selection of actions are 
made based on economic criteria – sometimes the rational approach to a risk is to 
repair its effects, and not to prevent them. The first type of interaction is defined 
as the provision of operational security, the second of providing business continuity. 
The impacts of both types are based on risk analysis, its causes and consequences, 
but also on an analysis of the essence of the organisation’s activities, associated with 
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a given manifestation of risk. Risk appears via phenomena of a specific character, 
whose effect on an organisation is possible only when such a phenomenon strikes 
at a vulnerability of the organisation relating to one or more of the processes it has 
implemented, or in the sense of the organisational shortcomings of such a process, 
or weakness in the selection of resources used by the process. In practice, every 
critical event (the materialisation of the risk) is an infringement of a resource 
(or loss of control over a resource) conditioning the implementation of the process. 
Risk analysis therefore depends on the identification and assessment:
  of processes that determine the performance of an organisation’s tasks,
  of the set of disruptive phenomena, and the probabilities of their occurrence,
  of the vulnerability of resources, measured in terms of the potential impact 
of a disruptive phenomenon on the activities of the organisation.
The practical influence on operational risk and ensuring security in terms of 
TSM depends on the design and implementation of solutions relevant to the basic 
themes presented in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1. Themes affecting operational risk in integrated management for securing the security of 
an organisation
Total Security Management (TSM)
Business continuity 
management
Information security 
management
Physical and technical 
security management
Personnel security 
management
1) Which processes 
are we protecting?
2) What disruptions 
do we anticipate?
1) What information 
do we protect?
2) Against what are 
we protecting it?
1) What sites do we pro-
tect?
2) What are we concerned 
about?
1) What kind of people 
do we need?
2) What do we require 
of them?
3) How do we protect resources and processes?
For example, DRII, 
TSM/BCP methodo-
logy
For example, TISM 
methodology Industry best practices
Industry best prac-
tices
Ensuring the security of the organisation, especially in terms of TSM, is recog-
nised for particular types of resources. Therefore, we talk about personnel security, 
physical and technical security, financial security and of information and IT security. 
It is easy to see that the individual categories are closely related, and also partly 
overlap. And so we speak, for example, of personnel security, of personal data 
security, of the physical security of financials, etc.
Ensuring physical and technical security derives from the following key points:
  the need to circumscribe the precise location of the boundaries of the orga-
nisation and the zones of execution of various functions and services to 
clients, and by employees of the organisation and for their benefit;
  the need to imagine and define potential threats and possible scenarios of 
their materialisation as disruption of the organisation’s normal operation;
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  the need to organise processes for performing the organisation’s functions, 
providing physical security and matching and applying security solutions, 
including technical.
The use of best practice within this subject depends on developing:
  a division (classification) of protection zones,
  rules for the selection of security solutions,
  rules of security for each zone,
  rules to authorise access
  rules to monitor protection,
  principles of selection and verification of security personnel.
However, ensuring personnel security derives from the following key points:
  the need to select and hire employees with a high level of morale and 
responsibility (the “rule of righteousness”);
  the requirement of adequacy of employee professional skills to the tasks 
performed and the potential ability to adapt to changing requirements, 
which may be derived from the entity’s organisational and business develop-
ment or the competitive development of the market (the “rule of expertise”);
  the need both for personnel selection and organisation of work, which 
from the two parties cocreates the atmosphere and conditions for the iden-
tification of the professional success of an employee with the success of the 
employer (the “rule of loyalty”).
The use of best practice within this subject depends on developing: 
  a Code of Ethics for employees,
  principles of selection and verification of personnel,
  arrangements made for joining the organisation and departing from it,
  rules for determining individual and team roles and workstation design,
  principles of delegation,
  principles of remuneration and motivation,
  principles of personnel review,
  rules for determining individual career paths,
  principles of promotion,
  principles of systematic employee training,
  rules for protecting the confidentiality of the company, customers, etc.
In turn, ensuring information security derives from the following key points:
  ensuring that information is made available only to authorised persons 
(the “rule of confidentiality”);
  ensuring the complete accuracy and completeness of information and the 
methods for processing it (the “rule of integrity”);
  ensuring that authorised persons have access to information and associated 
assets only when it is needed (the “rule of availability”).
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Three levels of substantive information security management have been 
defined: 
  information security policy – definition of security requirements at the level 
of the entire organisation, and for all groups of information and all the 
systems and solutions for the processing of that information (including 
storing and transporting);
  information group – detailing safety requirements for groups of informa-
tion, isolated primarily as an autonomous class of information for specific 
issues processed in a specific functionality (such as financial information, 
personnel information, customer information, etc.), but also sometimes 
covered by separate general legal provisions, for example, classified infor-
mation, information on personal data;
  a processing system – meeting the safety requirements by traditional 
systems, but mostly IT, which process certain groups of information for 
certain categories of users.
Regarding the strictly IT solutions, it is necessary to ensure the protection of 
information in three basic criteria12:
  information security,
  security of service provision,
  authenticity and accountability of data and entities.
The first criterion consists of the following components:
  confidentiality – information is available only to those persons who are 
entitled to it;
  integrity – ensuring the accuracy and completeness of the information, and 
the methods and means of processing it;
  availability – ensuring that authorised users have access to information 
and associated resources whenever required.
The second criterion consists of the following components:
  reliability of systems – the system can be absolutely relied upon, it is user-
friendly and resistant to random operator errors (foolproof);
  integrity of systems – the accuracy of the system and methods and ways of 
processing information it uses;
  availability – ensuring that authorised users have guaranteed access to the 
system and its resources.
The third criterion consists of the following components:
  data indisputable – the data stored in the system and made available through 
it are certain, and can be relied upon;
12  Standards: ISO 12207, ISO 13355, ISO 15408, ISO 27001-6  series and the ITIL principles of 
best practice.
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  indisputable subjects – the accuracy of identification of the system user and 
confirmation of authorisation to use the information it contains;
  settlement accounts of subjects – ensuring that permitted (authorised) users are 
not able to deny the fact of their access to the system and the documented 
use of its resources.
In designing security solutions, the following general principles are applied 
relating to the specific types of resources which are used by the organisation in its 
activities, including primarily to the people as the main source of danger and threat 
object:
  rule of authorised access – each employee has been trained in the principles 
of safety and security and meets the criteria for admission to employment 
and information (business secrets);
  rule of necessary privileges – every employee has the right of access to work 
and information, limited to that which is necessary to perform the tasks 
entrusted to him;
  rule of necessary knowledge – every employee knows about the work that is 
accessible to him, at least as far as it is necessary for the performance of his 
duties;
  rule of necessary services – the organisation provides only those services 
required by the customer;
  rule of security measures – each security mechanism must be secured by 
another (similar), and in special cases an additional (third) independent 
security measure may be used;
  rule of collective awareness – all employees are aware of the need to protect 
the resources of the organisation and actively participate in this process;
  rule of individual responsibility – specific individuals bear responsibility for 
the security of the individual elements;
  rule of necessary presence – only authorised persons have the right to be in 
certain places;
  rule of constant readiness – the organisation is prepared for all threats; it is 
unacceptable to temporarily disable security mechanisms;
  rule of weakest link – the security level is determined by the weakest (least 
secure) element;
  rule of completeness – the security is only effective when used in a compre-
hensive approach, addressing all levels and units in the work process in the 
broad sense;
  rule of evolution – each organisation must constantly adapt its internal 
mechanisms to changing external conditions;
  rule of suitability – mechanisms used must be appropriate to the situation;
  rule of acceptable balance – remedial measures taken may not exceed the 
level of acceptance (especially recommended here are metrics of cost for 
inputs, outputs, and potential losses).
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5.2. Business continuity as security 
Business continuity, as a requirement of the organisation conceived as a system of 
action13, is as a basic postulate analogous to the idea, with a long and broadly 
described tradition, of the requirement of reliability of technical systems as products 
of human creativity and action. Like reliability, defined as the degree of an object’s 
ability to fulfil its requirements, it is crucial to assess the quality of the system or 
technical product, just as in the evaluation of the effectiveness and quality of the 
system of (the organisation’s) activities, an important component of this evaluation 
is the ability of the organisation to maintain continuous operation. This type of 
expectation is primarily due to the attitude of the organisation to the client in 
the broader sense as a recipient of the effect of the action (product or service), 
and consists of an equally broadly understood organisational culture.
The risk experienced by an organisation is a direct consequence of the actions 
carried out, whose necessity and sense result from a conscious decision on the 
need for and direction of such action. The uncertainty that constantly surrounds 
you does not mean that you take risks. For this to happen, there must be a need for 
action. This is what is risky. Threats, as a form of manifestation of risk, are examined 
in terms of their potential impact on the organisation and are potential phenomena, 
toward which are geared: observation of evidence of disruptions and preventive 
actions carried out in order to prevent the interaction between the risk and the 
system of the organisation (its vulnerabilities). In practical terms, the risk lies in 
the fact that the decision taken and the action which is its consequence may face 
particular difficulties and obstacles relevant to the overall uncertainty in the area 
and environment of the organisation, and are perceived as a threat in anticipation. 
So the threat:
  is a form of actualisation of the risk,
  has an objectively measurable form and specific characteristics,
  has a source and a cause,
  is characterised by a specific mechanism of materialisation,
  impacts on the organisation’s system of operation in a way that is subjec-
tively measurable from the perspective of that organisation, and the degree 
of impact is dependent on the susceptibility of the organisation’s system of 
operation and its environment.
In turn, these disruptions (materialisations of threats) are the actual object of 
activities referred to more broadly as business continuity policy. When a given 
threat affects the organisation’s system of operation or its environment, and the 
system becomes vulnerable to these effects, we are dealing with disruption that:
  is due to the interaction between the risk and the system of operation or 
the environment of that system,
13  System of operation – the set of elements that contribute to the occurrence of a specific effect 
(outcome) and between which there is an interaction organised with regard to the effect, even in situ-
ations with the disruptive influence of the environment.
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  results in significant changes in the operation of the organisation,
  is not evaluated objectively, and subjectively is evaluated from the per-
spective of a given system of operation.
Therefore, the procedure for ensuring business continuity is similar to that 
which serves to protect against threats. They differ in the relation of time and 
nature of impact in terms of the threat, which are intended to be combatted by 
security and are to be reduced as a result of conduct ensuring business continuity. 
Both complement each other to ensure that the organisation has the expected 
resistance to various circumstances and violations of normal activity.
5.3. Management maturity assessment as a security 
provision
Meeting the aforementioned principles of information security is the basis for 
assessing the degree of maturity of the security management, a model of which 
was proposed by the IT auditors’ association ISACA (see Figure 5.1).
Degree 0
No awareness
– no defined security requirements
– security treated as an issue for individual users
Degree I
Beginning
– awareness of a need
–  management considers it a problem for IT services  
(e.g. access rights, antivirus protection)
Degree II
Intuitive
– attempts to create security
– no uniform approach
– results dependent on the engagment of interested parties
Degree III
Defined
–  defined principles (including a Security Policy) throughout the 
organisation
– security procedures and maintained and communicated
– no monitoring of application
Degree IV
Managed
– uniform approach for all units and all solutions
– business perspective applies 
– application monitoring mechanism in place
Degree V
Optimised
– conscious risk management
– compatibility between security strategy and business strategy
– provision of security as a process (knowledge, improvement)
Figure 5.1. Maturity levels of information security management
Source: ISACA - Information Security Audit and Control Association
6. Ensuring business continuity in managing 
operational risk
Activity. For further arguments, it is important to emphasise the difference between 
activity and action. This is because of the focus on action understood as only part 
of the activity. It is assumed that each organisation runs activity, which consists of 
individual actions. The inspiration for this distinction is the process view, by which 
the organisation’s activity takes the form of processes which implement subsequent 
operations. Activity corresponds to the generality of processes in the organisation 
[Waters, 2002]. Action, however, corresponds to the manipulation layer of activity 
(handling), corresponding to the transformations of resources within primary and 
secondary processes. We should also distinguish between the concept of “operational” 
activity, relating to the operation, and the concept of “operative” activity, being the 
current one.
Organisational dysfunctionality, which this book deals with, can be explained 
as follows. If there is a failure of a device, a system (e.g. IT), human error, accident 
in the workplace, then we are talking about the dysfunction of the action itself or 
its direct conditions, which is seen in terms of business continuity. If, however, the 
following consequences of an action occur: lack of profitability of the organisation, 
insufficient level of sales of its products, the lack of liquidity, then this is a dysfunc-
tion of the organisation that goes beyond performance and beyond the area of 
operational risk analysis, procedures for safe operation or providing business conti-
nuity, even though it may result in discontinuation of operation.
Action can be understood in narrow and broad senses. The narrower sense 
comes from the praxeological theory of organisation – according to this it is a deli-
berate, conscious and arbitrary human behaviour, and so it is bound directly to 
human activity. In the general theory of organisation, the role of the human factor 
is not, however,  perceived as dominant. Thus, in a broader sense operation is the 
interaction occurring between two or more objects. Such an object is both the orga-
nisation itself and its individual components. From this perspective, action belongs 
to the ontological category “relationships”, which means that the concept is not defi-
nable, but can only be explained by exemplification. Operation is characterised by:
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  reality, as it is based on a specific (specified physically, temporally and 
spatially) transfer of matter, energy and information,
  productivity, as it brings certain effects in the form of changes (or preven-
ting changes) within the interacting entities as parties to the relationship 
or in their environment,
  objectivity, as it uses natural (laws of nature) or social regularities,
  autonomy, as it is based on an ontic foundation (it refers to real things),
  independence, it does not necessarily have to co-exist with interacting entities,
  dependence on resources.
Action depends on the execution of an operation, but is limited to the layer 
of manipulating resources and relationships, whereas the previously discussed 
activity includes in addition elements of management, including the assessment 
(evaluation) of the results of actions.
Business continuity. Ensuring business continuity is a therapy against disrup-
tions. Business continuity refers to those operations included among primary and 
secondary processes, which means it focuses down on action, and skips business 
issues that go beyond the level of manipulation of resources that make up the 
broader conceptual category – i.e. activity. It can be assumed that speaking of 
business continuity we are limiting ourselves to the purely organisational aspect of 
activity.
Business continuity should be considered as one of the postulates of the perfect 
ideal system [Nadler, 1967], which the organisation should be. Practical attempts 
to implement various postulates of perfection, of course, can be and usually are to 
some degree mutual contradictions, for example, a typical operation to ensure the 
continuous operation of an IT system is to increase the redundancy of communi-
cation, or introduce additional security measures, and this is incompatible with 
the demands of optimal organisation and optimal operating expenses. The postu-
late regarding the perfect continuous operations of the system, that is its business 
continuity, is in practice unattainable, but can be used for marking out rational 
operation of the system in the forecasting approach for design or reengineering 
[Hammer, Champy, 1993].
6.1. Model provision of business continuity
In general, business continuity is the ability of organisations to respond to disrup-
tions in the conditions of normal operation, so that, where possible, it can quickly 
restore normal conditions, and where this is not possible, transfer to a scheduled 
substitute method to perform tasks. Business continuity can thus be seen both in 
the context of the organisation’s tasks and the processes for the implementation of 
these tasks, as well as in the context of the factors that may disrupt with these 
processes through the organisation’s vulnerability, representing its susceptibility to 
disruption.
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Providing business continuity includes:
  a mechanism by which the organisation can respond to disruptions (partly 
based on homeostasis14, and so spontaneous reaction by components of the 
organisation, and in part by systematically developing learned response 
capabilities),
  the process of developing the aforementioned mechanism of responsiveness 
to disruption (as a support process – within the meaning of process analysis 
– the core business of the organisation),
  on ongoing capacity management process ensuring business continuity 
and its continual improvement.
The mechanism to respond to disruptions includes:
  an organisational structure dedicated to the task of providing continuity, 
supplementing the overall organisational structure,
  formal regulations defining the relationships within the organisational 
structure that relate to providing continuity,
  perpetuated practice (possibly written) for proceeding in situations where 
a response is required to a fault that has been identified.
It should be particularly emphasised that the response to the disruption, in 
terms of ensuring business continuity, must be understood not only as a direct 
action against the disruptions, but also as a preventive activity, related to the 
analysis of the threats and vulnerabilities, and with an exploration of methods and 
solutions for preventing the occurrence of disruptions. In this sense, efforts towards 
business continuity and security are intertwined. From the point of view of busi-
ness continuity, security solutions provide prevention against threats, while from 
the point of view of security solutions, business continuity provides additional 
security for when the nominal security solutions fail. 
Therefore, whenever we are talking about:
  business continuity – it means the aspirational status of the organisation’s 
resistance to disruption,
  ensuring business continuity – it means a string of planned actions, aiming 
to prevent disruption or removing the causes and consequences of the oc-
currence of disruption, or the introduction of alternative operating condi-
tions until the effects of the disruption can be removed,
  managing provision of business continuity – this means the process of mana-
gement, involving in particular setting objectives, planning and monitoring 
the development of solutions for ensuring continuity, as well as the evalu-
ation of the actions and reasoning in relation to the potential and possible 
disruptions, in order to preserve the organisation’s business continuity.
Provision of business continuity derives from the following premises:
14  Homeostasis – the ability of a cybernetic system to self-regulate retaining a constant balance.
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  the need to make assumptions about the priority functions and processes 
for which ensuring business continuity is of the utmost importance for the 
organisation;
  the need to estimate the potential losses that may arise as a result of 
disruptions and the necessary expenditures for preventive and remedial 
solutions;
  the need to predict the potential disruption to normal operation and the 
need to develop scenarios for alternative and remedial actions.
Figure 6.1. The logical mechanism for violating the proper operation of the organisation 
Crucial elements of business continuity management provision are:
  an understanding of the risk facing the organisation, measured by its pro-
bability and its consequences, including identifying and prioritising critical 
business processes;
  an understanding of the impact that downtime can have on business acti-
vity (it is important to find a feasible solution for both smaller and major 
incidents that could threaten the existence of the organisation);
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  formulating and describing the business continuity strategy consistent 
with business objectives and priorities;
  formulating and describing plans to ensure business continuity consistent 
with the adopted strategy;
  regular testing and updating of the approved plans and processes;
  ensuring that the management of the provision of business continuity is 
incorporated in organisational processes and structure;
  consideration of the purchase of appropriate insurance, which may consti-
tute part of the business continuity process.
From the organisational perspective, the issues of managing the provision of 
business continuity coincide with quality management, security management, 
environmental management, financial management, and this type of business pro-
cesses within the organisation. Consideration of the integration of the management 
of these issues, also in the sense of common organisational structures of manage-
ment, is rational, and, indirectly, is also recommended by ISO 22301, ISO 22313, 
the ISO 900x series, the ISO 1400x series, the ISO 2700x series, and ISO 31000. 
It follows that:
  as part of the organisation’s business, we must be aware of the possibility 
of disruptions that prevent the normal continuation of that business;
  regardless of the nature of the causes of these events, in formal or in business 
terms of the perceived obligation of due diligence in carrying out its tasks, 
the organisation should strive to continue its operations;
  endeavours to continue business during the occurrence of disruption should 
be based on a previously developed, consistently perfected and tested busi-
ness continuity plan, sometimes called a contingency plan;
  ensuring business continuity includes the prediction of scenarios of potential 
disruption and separable design of:
  solutions to prevent the threats themselves,
  solutions for dealing as soon as possible with the consequences of disruptions,
  solutions for continuing limited operations in critical conditions;
  the approach to business continuity should be rational, that is, calculated 
to ensure a balance between the expected degree of certainty in maintaining 
business continuity and the costs of so maintaining it; it is therefore also 
necessary to assume the gradual surrender of successive elements of normal 
activity appropriate to the dimension of the critical situation identified 
(it does not always make sense, especially in economic terms, to make persi-
stent efforts to maintain business continuity);
  the continuity plan should be flexible enough to allow adaptation to disrup-
tions deviating from the expectations underlying the original plan;
  it is necessary to define the essence of the process of the organisation as 
the minimum activities that must be maintained with business continuity 
plans; the inability to continue such minimum activities is the basis for the 
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decision to abandon the use of the continuity plan and focus purely on 
removing the effects of disruption;
  in the preparation of the plan, business, legal and organisational aspects 
must be considered first and foremost, as these decide on the necessary 
scope of solutions;
  business analysis may concern the issue of the company’s prestige, and 
certainly a kind of balance sheet of risk and the financial resources allocated 
to its limitation; it is reasonable to treat the continuity plan as a long-term 
project in which the goals will be achieved gradually by successive appro-
ximations (versions of the business continuity plan);
  legal analysis is especially important when formulating the assumptions of 
the continuity plan, as it allows to define the scope of the company’s liability 
for various areas of its operations, identify sensitive points, and select non-
technical forms of security;
  organisational analysis allows the designation of resources, in particular 
the appropriate staff to operate the continuity plan in critical conditions, 
providing them with adequate material, financial and information resources, 
and the scope of decision-making autonomy relevant to such a situation, in 
day-to-day conditions enable them to prepare for such a difficult role;
  none of the elements of this analysis, and also the design of technical solu-
tions, is a closed stage; improvement of the continuity plan depends on 
constant renewal of the analysis and design of alternatives with respect to 
changes in the organisation’s business, development of the continuity plan, 
and conclusions after the materialisation of an actual disruption.
Systematic procedure for disruptions is to determine:
  Which disruptions (threats in interaction with the system of operation) are 
subject to remediation, i.e. are covered by the preventive arrangements or 
procedures to ensure continuity;
  which technical infrastructure facilities are protected against threats,
  which business processes are protected against threats,
  which information flows are protected from threats,
  who is responsible for restoring business continuity in the event of disruption.
Managing the organisation’s activity in accordance with the ISO 2700x and 
ISO22301 standards, you must create solutions that effectively preserve continuity. 
Such solutions may constitute the ability to start up a mechanism against the 
disturbance in order to restore the organisation’s state before the emergence of the 
disruption (homeostasis). The effectiveness of solutions to anticipate disruption 
and their relevance to actual events should be placed above the minimum threshold 
of acceptance by decision-makers, who usually carry out the assessment based on 
two criteria:
  the prestige of the organisation and its  degree of challenge as a result of 
the suspension or restriction of activities,
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  the relationship between cost of security solutions and the cost of potential 
losses and restoration of the actions harmed by the disruption.
A rationally conceived homeostasis system leads to a conscious temporary 
reduction of the quality of action to a level previously set in the light of such 
determinants as:
  the loss of a dissatisfied or injured client,
  benchmarking against competitors and best market practices,
  robust standards of cooperation with partners and customers – SLA15.
Reducing the operational quality should not last longer than the time needed 
to eliminate the causes and effects of the disruption, and the sometimes the former 
can resolve spontaneously, if such is the nature of the disruption.
The perception of disruption as a violation of business continuity is based on 
two essential factors in assessing their significance:
  the likelihood or incidence of disruption,
  the impact (malicious or not) of disruption on business continuity.
The assessment criteria are not measures, since they correspond to the nature 
of the phenomenon of each disruption individually. Assessment should be individual 
and made from the point of view of a given organisation. 
A model process for ensuring business continuity consists of actions in three 
areas of design, leading to the formation of: 
  an organisational structure established to ensure business continuity 
(or, more broadly risk, security and continuity),
  a spiral mechanism of organising activities to achieve the planning purpose,
  forms of consolidation of knowledge on the problem and solutions.
The spiral organising cycle, viewed wholly classically as the Deming cycle 
(PDCA), is to analyse the factors critical to designing solutions and their gradual 
improvement. The analysis includes: 
  identification of business processes in order to identify their most important 
elements,
  risk identification leading to the identification of threats and ways in which 
they may manifest,
  identifying vulnerabilities as critical resources or features of their situation, 
where the organisation is particularly strongly exposed to danger.
This analysis is used to specify the possible disruptions, as well to assess their 
significance. From this moment begins the planning phase for scenarios as remedial 
solutions (in the sense of the procedural concept) and as documentation of a solution. 
Planning includes typical activities in the organisational microcycle: idea, execution, 
15  SLA – Service Level Agreement – a realistic and precise determination by the parties of the 
parameters of the services they provide, including acceptable levels of unavailability of these services, 
as not altering the terms of, for example, a service agreement. See [Hiles, 1993].
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monitoring, use (often only as a test). The resulting scenario should be systematically 
improved in the context of practical experience (used for critical events) and the 
evolution of knowledge about the problem (periodic inspections using the line and 
staff method).
Consolidation of knowledge takes place in the direct organisational context, 
which includes training activities, tests and staff meetings inspired by the Crisis 
Committee and individual organisational units, and in the context of integrated 
documentation. Of great importance for the efficient collection and consolidation 
of knowledge (also in the sense of independence from absenteeism and turnover 
of staff involved in work on business continuity) is the introduction of compre-
hensive principles of documentation and its internal editing. This documentation 
is for use in responding to the occurrence of a critical situation, when there is often 
no time to think about interpretation of the notes. Knowledge consolidation is in fact 
the act of perpetuating the experience and its ensuing appropriate working practices. 
The basic intention is to prepare a long-term programme of building capacity 
to maintain continuous operation together with the estimated costs of such capacity 
in relation to the estimated potential consequences (losses as a result of) disruptions. 
In view of the finding that only two factors determine the assessment of disrup-
tion (the size of its impact and its incidence), in this case their superposition leads 
to the identification of four general approaches to threats response (Figure 6.2). 
The model approach to threat/disruption response can take place in four ways, 
known as approaches to response. The assignment of individual cases of threats to 
individual methods of model response is not only individual and subjective, but 
also temporary. It is advisable to periodically, as frequent as possible verify such an 
assessment, taking into account the development of the organisation and its system 
of action, and the increase in knowledge of the impact of specific threats and 
the likelihood of their occurrence in the form of disruptions. The allocation to each 
category should take into account economic and prestige criteria. The evaluation 
metrics are determined by the semantic differential method. Addressing the response 
to threats (and consequently dealing with disruptions) is a synthetic view of organi-
sational approaches to the problem. It is based on the adoption of the four general 
approaches to threats and disruptions, and on determining the way (method, rules, 
responsibility) to develop specific solutions, edited in the form of policies to deal 
with disruptions. It also clarifies the organisational structure, which is entrusted 
with the administration of this problem.
Toleration means accepting temporary inconveniences. Monitoring means 
that the knowledge of the disruption is sufficient to trigger the compensation me-
chanism on the basis of organisational homeostasis. Prevention means investment 
and technical measures to prevent the negative effects of disruption. Business con-
tinuity planning is a set of scenarios for threats expected to materialise and the 
activities planned for such events.
The approach of tolerating disruption refers to proceeding with disruptions 
which are external to the organisation, and only secondarily affect it, especially 
non-invasive, and chiefly non-destructive. An example: a transportation company 
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which deals with the press distribution – if there is a disruption involving the occur-
rence of intense fog, the natural solution is to wait until the intensity of the fog 
reduces, and the subsequent distribution of the newspapers. The organisation’s 
“Tolerance Policy” (rules of conduct) should define the basic rules for accepting 
the ensuing disruption, examining the conditions for its persistence, confirmation 
of its end, and return to routine functioning. The policy document should be accom-
panied by procedures detailing the necessary activities for organisational units in 
the case of disruptions which qualify as relevant to this policy. Examples of rules 
– despite the fact that the organisation’s reaction to disruption may in extreme 
cases rely on the suspension of fulfilling its statutory functions, it may be appro-
priate to inform trading partners or the general public of this, directing employees 
to do remedial work which are intractable to the disruption, starting off solutions 
tracking the intensity of the disruption. In contrast, when the problem is resolved, 
it should be verified that it is possible to restart suspended operations/functions.
Figure 6.2. Model procedure for threats 
The monitoring approach relates to the conduct with disruptions that are 
trivial in nature, although frequent (by which we must assume an incidentally 
greater impact due to the accumulation of events in a short time), but clearly non-
destructive. This approach leads to the obligation to follow detailed solutions for 
organisational moves and even meticulous internal regulation of internal reaction 
to all typical disruptions. The essence is a negligible or zero increase in cost due to 
response solutions, which are mainly of an organisational nature. An example: 
employee sickness absence – providing an adequate response to this disruption 
requires the introduction, at least in relation to sensitive jobs, of an obligation to 
notify the employer as soon as possible and the development of principles for 
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organising replacements. The “Monitoring Policy” (code of conduct) adopted in 
organisations should define the basic rules for the organisation’s response to 
disruptions, where the awareness of their existence in conjunction with the existing 
procedures of behaviour should be adequate to start up the the organisation’s 
disruption compensation mechanisms. The policy document should be accompanied 
by procedures detailing the necessary activities for organisational units in the case 
of disruptions which qualify as relevant to this policy. 
The prevention approach refers to the handling of significant disruptions, 
which are destructive and potentially occur frequently. The natural consequences 
of this prevention approach are investment and risk mitigation solutions. The “Preven-
tion Policy” (rules of conduct) adopted in organisations should specify plans for 
the organisation of preventive measures, which in relation to particular essential 
elements of the organisation, especially the vulnerable elements of the technical 
infrastructure, to overcome the destructive effects of the disruption. Typical activities 
undertaken for this purpose are: the creation of backup and redundant solutions 
which are multiplied compared to average needs. The policy document should be 
accompanied by analyses precisely defining the degree and extent of sensitivity of 
existing solutions, plans for risk mitigation solutions, procedures/instructions 
detailing the organisation and operation of ongoing teams, and specialist teams 
to combat specific threats (fire, hacker attack, failure of computer systems). 
Examples – a backup computer centre, mirrored lines of communication carried 
along physically different paths and/or using different transmission media, inclu-
ding shifts for special intervention teams with the appropriate skills.
The planning approach known as business continuity planning refers to 
the handling of significant disruptions, destructive, but rare, which economically 
justify the decision to abandon the prevention approach and consciously take risks. 
An example: the Stock Exchange – world statistics say that the suspension of trading 
due to malfunctions in the computer system occurs no more often than once every 
few years, and lasts no longer than one day, so it is reasonable to rely on a scenario 
of replacement operation, which such a rarely occurring serious failure is dealt 
with. The “Business Continuity Planning Policy” (rules of conduct) adopted in 
organisations should specify plans for the actions necessary in the event of materia-
lisation of risks in the form of a specific disruption. The plans should include orga-
nisational arrangements for the conduct of the policy itself, and scenarios for 
disruptions and their anticipated responses, in order to ensure the continuation of 
the organisation’s primary business activity at least. In addition, the business conti-
nuity planning policy should define rules for responding ad hoc to events which, 
unfortunately, were not predicted in the scenarios (either in general or in terms of 
scale). The business continuity planning policy document should be accompanied 
by procedures/instructions detailing the organisation of the departments respon-
sible for business continuity plans, the basic rules of communication in emergency 
conditions, rules for responding to common threats, scenarios covering predicted 
extensive disruption and response to them, and rules for including the experience 
in combatting the distortions which have taken place recently in the new version 
of contingency plans. In practice, these plans are divided into two classes. The first 
6. Ensuring business continuity in managing operational risk 84
class are DRP (disaster recovery plans), which relate to proceedings in the case of 
obvious technical failures (including IT failures) and the associated losses in the 
current availability of technical infrastructure. DRP define the procedure for repairing 
or replacing the component of the technical infrastructure. The second class are 
proper BCP (business continuity plans) that determine how, in the case of a serious 
disruption of business activities, to ensure the substitution conditions for those 
activities and how to organise a course to restore the status quo ante. BCPs use 
DRPs, which are carried out spontaneously in the case of technical failure or are 
implemented within the BCP plans in the event of serious disruption to business 
activity, if technical failure is part of that disruption.
6.2. Organising business continuity 
The basic idea of assigning competences to departments responsible for the daily 
management of the preparation of policies to address the problems of disruption 
and the organisation of crisis management activated in the event of emergency 
is shown in Figure 6.3. 
Figure 6.3. Business continuity management 
The BCM Coordinator (also known as the Anti-Crisis Team) is a unit or opera-
tional staff role16 permanently set in the organisation, established to coordinate 
the organisation’s preparations for conscious and planned coping with disruption 
of business activity, including the development of documentation of emergency 
16  A unit is an organisational unit formally functioning in the organisational structure. Role 
means a complex of additional tasks assigned to a position or organisational unit, which broaden the 
scope of existing tasks for the position/unit.
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scenarios, complete procedures regarding the implementation of routine or emer-
gency business processes, and instructions. In between the meetings of the Crisis 
Committee, it coordinates the ongoing implementation of the tasks imposed by the 
Committee on the individual organisational units, is responsible for maintaining 
and distributing the current BCP documentation (plans, scenarios), and is responsible 
for organising training and testing. In the event of an emergency, it supports the 
actions Crisis Committee.
The Crisis Committee (also called the Crisis Staff) is the executing body, 
which meets periodically, regularly as part of the planned work on the development 
of capacity for effective business continuity, or ad hoc basis in cases of emergency. 
Its function is to order (and settle on the implementation of) individual organisa-
tional units’ specific tasks in the framework of the gradual preparation of BCM 
solutions and BCP and DRP documentation, and the acquisition of skills for dealing 
with crisis situations. It should prepare itself to lead recovery from the crisis, if 
such occurs. It should have a strong authority from the organisation’s management 
(preferably it will include one of the members of that management). In many, 
especially smaller, organisations, the role of the committee is played by the Board 
of Directors. After the occurrence of a serious disruption, the committee becomes 
the crisis headquarters, with major powers of everyday management, as the serio-
usness of the event may require the rapid adoption of non-standard actions asso-
ciated with periodic changes in business practices, subordination and tasks of 
organisational units and employees, and fast-track decision-making and special 
investments.
Emergency Teams are the task forces needed in each field or selected unit, 
subordinated to the Crisis Committee, acting locally on a similar basis to the central 
committee. Also, if necessary, at the headquarters these task forces will operate in 
units of key importance in the event of a crisis in the administration or IT depart-
ments. It is also desirable to appoint Emergency Teams beforehand in the major 
organisational units, especially departments responsible for IT (offices, departments, 
centres) or local units of special importance. Appropriate training for the members 
of these Teams is also essential.
The basic assumptions of business continuity and their implementation in 
a given organisation are described in a special document “Business Continuity 
Policy”, as described further. The starting point for this policy is to recognise the 
threats and critical components of the technical infrastructure of the organisation 
distinguished by analysis of the organisation’s business processes and their position 
in the infrastructure plan. The imposition of these elements leads to the determi-
nation of maps of potential disruptions, which must be resolved before or after 
they occur. For this purpose implementation documents are created for business 
continuity policy and special procedures. 
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6.3. The analysis and planning procedure
Implementation of business continuity management policy faces the typical barriers 
for exceptional management (disruptions are a kind of exception in the routine 
course of work in the organisation). More important barriers are:
  lack of awareness of the needs of the process approach,
  lack of risk management in the organisation,
  lack of integration of risk management, security and continuity,
  lack of support from the top management for risk, security and continuity 
management,
  lack of experience in this type of project,
  treatment of the issue of business continuity as a typical problem to be 
solved by a one-time project to develop an emergency plan, and not the 
establishment of a process of continuous improvement of skills to deal with 
incidents;
  hastily addressing the issue without prior selection of methods for solving 
the problem and the methods for executing the project,
  underestimation of the importance of documentation and its regular updating.
In taking account of these barriers, the basis for the implementation of policies 
for dealing with disruption is the appropriate plan that arises in the process of 
analysis and design activities, among which stand out in particular:
  analysis of the processes in the organisation,
  identification of stakeholders,
  analysis of the threats to the organisation (like BIA or risk analysis),
  analysis of the susceptibility of the organisations to to disruption (likw BIA 
or risk analysis),
  mapping of disruptions,
  development of regulations, procedures, instructions,
  implementation of approaches to prevent disruption,
  implementation of approaches to business continuity planning,
  implementation of approaches to monitoring disruption,
  implementation of approaches to tolerating disruption,
  implementation of the adopted procedure for disruptions,
  testing business continuity plans.
This may be organised as shown in Figure 6.4. Some of these activities 
constitute a cycle which, repeated periodically in a spiral of improvement, enables 
the organisation to maintain and develop business continuity solutions.
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Figure 6.4. Planning using TSM-BCP methods 
Analysis of threats to the organisation
Risk analysis is carried out using the standard list of threats (see Table 6.1). At the 
beginning threats which are irrelevant to a given organisation should be deleted, 
and possibly others, specific to the organisation, should be added. Then there should 
be an assessment of whether the threat is external or internal from the point of view 
of the organisation. The question is whether the threat within the organisation 
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materialises in its proper form and constitutes a problem for the organisation, for 
example, is a hurricane a properly identified threat, or should it be damage to the 
building. This is closely related to dividing risk into of causal and effect relation-
ships, where causal means finding solutions closer to security and monitoring, 
whereas effect means finding solutions closer to business continuity. External threats 
cause internal consequences for business continuity, and it is the latter we seek to 
determine. It may therefore be necessary for successive iterations (verifications) of 
assessment in order to exclude certain external threats as unlikely or replace them 
with more clearly defined internal threats. Causal threats should be included in 
the security policy and covered by monitoring and prevention.
In the next step, we assess whether the threat is direct or indirect. It is necessary 
to determine whether the disruption does indeed affect the organisation, or is it 
affected by a subordinate factor, for example, whether a street demonstration is 
itself the disruption, or is it rather the de facto lack of access to the premises caused 
by the demonstration. And in this case causal threats indicate the need for moni-
toring and prevention in the context of security policy.
At the end, a revised final list of risks is prepared, classifying causal threats in 
terms of security policy, but effect threats in terms of developing plans for ensuring 
business continuity.
Table 6.1. Standard list of threats17.
Threats
Natural disasters
• earthquake
• environmental contamination
• flood
• hurricane
• lightning strike
• other
Terrorism
• blackmail
• attack
• other
Physical disruptions
• no access to buildings
• building damage
• too low/high atmospheric temperature
• too high atmospheric humidity
• fire
• flood
• other
17  Other suggestions for the lists of threats can be found in the following standards: ISO 
27005:2009 and ISO/IEC TR 13335-3:1998.
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Threats
Functional disruptions
• strike
• sabotage
• unavailability of workers
• accident
• other
Technical disruptions
• exhaustion of materials
• lack of power
• air conditioning malfunction
• other
IT disruptions 
Technical infrastructure:
• server emergency
• workstation emergency
• peripherals emergency
• network emergency
• cable emergency
• no connection to external networks
• other
Software:
• licence expiry
• unauthorised deletion
• malfunction
• other
Harmful software:
• viruses
• other
Data:
• data loss or destruction
• unauthorised data access
• unauthorised data copying
• unauthorised data modification
• other
Other disruptions
• lack of human resources
• lack of financial resources
• lack of material resources
• lack of external services
• other
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Analysis of the organisation’s susceptibility to disruption
This analysis18  is carried out using the standard list of critical resources (see tab. 6.2). 
Firstly, verify and clarify the classification of categories of resources in a manner 
appropriate to the specific situation of a given organisation. Then identify all 
the resources that each in location of organisational units (headquarters + field 
and auxiliary locations), in the light of process analysis and routes of information 
flow, may affect the continuity of business processes and information processing. 
As conventional facilities with a particular impact on the conditions of business 
activity, we must take into account external services, including those universals 
such as: supply of water, gas, electricity, telephone communications, and specific, 
such as: cooperation, supply of materials, maintenance services.
As a result of the analysis, a revised list of critical facilities is prepared 
separately for each location, and there is an analysis of their vulnerability to 
operational risk.
Table 6.2. Sample list of critical resources (facilities)
Categories Example
A. Buildings Company’s own building
B. Technical and industrial buildings Production hall, boiler room, computer centre
C. Office centres Office space rented in a different building
D. External technical equipment External free standing electricity generator 
E. Internal technical equipment Internal air conditioning or generator 
F. IT infrastructure IT equipment
G. External telecom equipment Satellite dish on the roof 
H. External services Telecommunications
I. Logical facilities/virtual solutions Non-material obligations
J. Key employees Licenced investment consultant in a financial company 
X. Other
18  The vulnerability of an organisation to a given threat results from its ongoing organisation, 
assessed in terms of the importance of business processes and the possibility of a negative impact of 
individual threats on these processes.
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Mapping of disruptions
At this stage the mapping of interference for individual resources takes place, 
although more often for locations and technical and logical19 facilities potentially 
affected by specific threats (factors: process – facility – threat, the idea of a three-
dimensional map of disruptions is shown in Figure 6.5). It is very useful to classify 
operational risk as presented in Table 3.1. Each of the types of operational risk 
presented serves to look at the possible disruptions from the particular perspective 
of the specific risk.
The map is used to finally verify which threats may be the most severe and 
which facilities are most sensitive in the business perspective. The importance of 
a potential disruption should be assessed and verified through the prism of main-
taining process stability. 
The disruption map is the most comprehensive analytical document. Thorough 
preparation allows for a comprehensive solution to the problem of providing 
business continuity. However, do not be afraid that this analysis leads to the develop-
ment of scenarios for each identified potential disruption. Each scenario describes 
the remedial actions associated with a threat group treated together due to common 
causes or effects.
Figure 6.5. Factors affecting disruption 
Individual positions on the disruption map are assigned to one of the models 
of proceeding with disruption according to the classification shown in Figure 6.2. 
Development of regulations, procedures, instructions
Processes and the activities that make them up need to keep their repeatability, exactly 
as they were designed and adopted as appropriate. To obtain this organisational 
19  Logical objects are elements of computer software, IT systems, or parts thereof.
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stability of action, the principle of documenting good practice should be applied. 
The main types of documents used are rules, procedures and instructions.
Comprehensive coverage of the whole of the organisation’s activities by a set 
of procedures depends on determining the issues, processes and sub-areas to be 
explored and regulated. This is done by extracting the basic criteria for the selection 
of issues and possible superposition of some of them. The criteria are: for example: 
organisational (functional) structure, process structure, types of resources, subsys-
tems of the IT system, business continuity, security, correctness of operation.
It is necessary to archive all subsequent versions of the individual procedures. 
This need is a consequence of, for example, the requirements of the audit, where 
each questionable situation (problem) assessed in the past should be applicable to 
the regulatory standards then.
Implementation of an approach to prevent disruption
This approach mainly includes investment activities, and, prior to the realisation 
of the investment, activities towards an approach to business continuity planning. 
The disruption map presents a specific list of the organisation’s vulnerabilities 
(in terms of business continuity issues). Many of these weaknesses can be reduced 
or eliminated by technical investments. Their implementation, however, is signi-
ficantly hampered by the need for extensive research on the scope of a given inve-
stment and the final effectiveness of the new technical solution, which should be 
to fully remove the organisation’s vulnerability to the disruption under consideration. 
The ultimate rationality of the proposed solution is reviewed in the light of the 
budgetary capabilities of the organisation, the payback period, and economic criteria. 
Typical investments are:
  duplication of equipment,
  duplication of computer centres (building a backup centre)
  multiplication of lines of communication,
  multiplication of access points to the network of public services,
  backup power supplies,
  physical, power and logical separation of servers or IT control centre envi-
ronments,
  despite the specialisation of servers maintaining the potential to reduce 
work to a smaller number of them,
  asynchrony of data security,
  specialist shifts.
The investment plan adopted by the decision makers for technical solutions 
is a key document upon which are based the actions constituting this approach.
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Implementation of the approach to business continuity 
planning
These activities are divided as in Table 6.3.
Table 6.3. Division of labour in response to disruption
Organisational unit Prior to occurrence  of disruption After the occurrence of disruption
BCM Co-ordinator and all or-
ganisational units 
Drawing up a business con-
tinuity plan
Analysis and improvement of the busi-
ness continuity plan
Crisis Committee (Crisis Staff) Testing of the business con-
tinuity plan
Ensuring business continuity, removing 
the causes and effects of the disruption 
The culmination of the business continuity plans are the situational scenarios. 
These are divided into:
  external scenarios that describe possible versions of the development of 
events in the future over which the organisation has no control,
  internal scenarios that are based on causal reasoning, linking choice of 
action with goal, and certain results are preferred by the organisation in 
accordance with its hierarchy of objectives [van der Heijden, 1996].
In developing scenarios, especially during the first creation of a business con-
tinuity plan, there should be a very strict course of top-down reasoning, reaching 
to the base of knowledge about the organisation and its objectives. The successive 
steps of this reasoning (some may be ignored) are:
  goal setting (even the organisation’s mission),
  determining the essence of the organisation’s activities (basic processes) 
based on process analysis,
  determine the boundary restriction for activity in the case of disruption (as 
to the scope and critical functions and the minimum acceptable quality of 
action), including Business Impact Analysis,
  assessment of threats and the resulting disruption (verification of the di-
sruption map),
  assessment of the ongoing capacity of the organisation to respond ad hoc 
to disruption,
  adoption of organisational solutions to confront the calculated disruption 
(appointment of a BCM coordinator and Crisis Committee, and the deve-
lopment of appropriate regulations, rights and responsibilities),
  development  of disruption scenarios and response activities for them,
  testing the situations described in the scenarios,
  verification of the specific procedure based on tests or conclusions from 
the existence of disruption.
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Situational scenarios organising prognoses, specific, precise thinking and action, 
enable the simulation and testing of the emergency plans prepared. At the same 
time, it should be borne in mind that the scenarios for responding to disruptions 
do not guarantee the full effectiveness of the prognoses either in terms of disrup-
tion, or as to the course of emergency situations, or as to the appropriateness of 
the plans to the actual events, and they therefore require a flexible margin for 
unforeseen factors/events.
Implementation of the approach to monitoring disruption
This mainly covers activity of an organisational nature, and only then regulatory. 
Key to it is the monitoring of the extent of disruption, and whether in relation to 
this the routine compensation mechanism is sufficient. Developing policy solutions 
relies primarily on formal confirmation of organisational solutions compensating 
for disruption, and therefore transcribing, analysing, and possibly improving or 
expanding upon existing practice, and considering what solutions are needed in 
shaping the organisational structure, the responsibilities of individual units, regu-
lations, procedures and instructions. Monitoring disruption should be regulated by 
procedures/instructions to make it possible to evaluate and decide when the degree 
of disruption exceeds the limit of coverage by monitoring and, therefore, the business 
continuity (plan) approach must apply.
Implementation of the approach to tolerating disruption
This mainly covers activity of a legal nature, and only then regulatory. Basically, 
it does not require a substantial response to the disruption, but it is necessary to 
regulate a number of issues. For example, how to determine the measurement of 
the intensity of disruption must be decided, and who, how, and on what basis 
determines the organisation’s planned response to the disruption and, by analogy, 
decides to discontinue this action and return to routine performance of tasks. 
The organisation’s activity, in its nature tolerating disruption, involves a slight modi-
fication or a temporary interruption of routine work, when it is usually required to 
notify employees, customers, suppliers, etc. - it should provide an appropriate situ-
ational scenario. Furthermore, it is important that business responsibility towards 
partners (customers, employees and service providers) be defined and limited in 
accordance with the policy formulated. 
Implementation of the adopted procedure for disruptions
The implementation of a policy for dealing with disruption comprises three strands 
of activity:
  establishment of the formal organisational structures,
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  definition of the principles for monitoring threats and responding to 
disruption, investment plans and models of accident scenarios,
  development of regulations, procedures and instructions, and detailed 
scenarios for conduct in the event of disruption.
6.4. Business continuity maturity model  
Business continuity management is still a young concept in management theory, 
although patterns are already sought for assessing the relevance of management 
in this regard. A good example is the BCMM20 method (Table 6.4). 
Table 6.4. Business Continuity Maturity assessment method 
Maturity level  
of business 
continuity 
Basic range Advanced range
Approval  
of senior 
management
Professional 
support
Management General 
participation
Planning 
activities
Joint 
action
Level 1 Intuitive No No No No No No
Level 2 Supported Marginal Partial No No No No
Level 3 Centrally managed Partial Yes Partial No No No
Level 4 Aware Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Level 5 Improved Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Level 6 Integrated Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source: Virtual Corporation.
The idea of the method is that the company (organisation) gradually attains 
higher maturity levels, introducing permanently fixed organisational structures, 
defining the roles of the participants, and the principles and action plan. At the 
same time, it is possible to lose an already reached level of maturity in situations 
where the organisation suffers profound technological, organisational, or environ-
mental changes. The maturity levels are: 
  Level 1 BCP is not perceived by top management as a significant and requ-
iring central management. It is dealt with by individual organisational 
units according to their own assessment and to the extent that they consi-
der to be correct.
  Level 2. The strategic importance of BCP is recognised by one of the organi-
sational units. Within an organisation, or amongs its supporting consultants, 
20  BCMM – Business Continuity Maturity Model, this method was developed by Virtual Corporation, 
Inc. See www.virtual-corp.net
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there is a specialist who can support work on BCP. Top management knows 
that it is a serious problem, but still does not give it the appropriate priority.
  Level 3. Those organisational units most interested in BCP conduct joint 
activities concerning the programme, but there is not a company-wide BCP. 
Top management is aware of the actions taken, and supports them, but is 
not yet capable of establishing structures, tasks and a BCP.
  Level 4. Top management is aware of the strategic importance of manag-
ing the BCP. A permanent office is established for managing BCP issues. 
There is work on integrated solutions, shared throughout the company. 
Critical processes are identified, and plans are developed to protect them. 
They are tested and routinely updated.
  Level 5. All organisational units have tested BCPs positively, including rules 
to make changes in the plans. Top management also participate in the tests. 
A several year development programme for BCP solutions has been drawn up.
  Level. 6 All organisational units received high marks in BCP preparation. 
The interaction between units is tested. Any actual changes to business 
processes are concurrently tracked and adapted in the BCPs.
Summary 
Every business organisation is formed with a view to a specific utility. These expec-
tations in the first place are related to the results of the organisation’s activity, but 
it is equally important that the activity itself is smooth, and as a consequence reaso-
nable costwise. The intention is therefore to create an effective and efficient orga-
nisation. In practice, however, its activity is impeded in the execution of business 
tasks. These are partly due to the risk that accompanies numerous competing players 
in the market, and refers to the organisation’s products (services), its customers, 
and its relationships with them. At the same time, some obstacles affect the internal 
governance of the organisation and are a derivative of operational risk. The orga-
nisation must be able to cope with these hurdles.
A special category of organised response to operational risk is ensuring busi-
ness continuity. This issue can be seen from a technical perspective, as well as 
business and social. In each perspective, the mechanism for the breach in business 
continuity remains the same. Its primary cause is the state of uncertainty which 
characterises our reality. Thus, every action the organisation takes, and its asso-
ciated decisions, bear a risk, manifested as certain threats. These, when they strike 
a susceptibility in the organisation’s operating rules or structure transform into 
specific disruptions that lead to perturbation of the organisation’s activity and to 
specific damage. The whole constitutes a sequence of consequences of the risk in 
operation.
An organisation’s logical response to disruption is to build a mechanism of 
homeostasis, based on the monitoring of threats, neutralising them, and when that 
fails, to restore the state before the disruption, and until then to provide forms of 
substitute operation. This conduct is the expression of a rational response to the 
inevitable risk, which should take into account the integration of security as 
prevention against threats and ensuring business continuity as a therapy against 
disruption (see Figure S.1). 
A detailed examination of this mechanism was the subject of the author’s 
research, the results of which enabled the creation of this text. The author's original 
contribution includes:
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Figure S.1. Integrated management of operational risk, security, and business continuity 
Legend for Figure S.1
TSM – total security management 
ISMS – information security management system [ISO 27001:2007].
Description in this column on 
the basis of fig. 3.1
Description in this column on 
the basis of fig. 6.4.
R1 – risk identification B1 – needs and solutions analysis C1 – initial task recognition
R2 – risk analysis and asses-
sment
B2 – defining internal standards C2 – project preparation
R3 – risk monitoring B3 – auditing standards observance C3 – needs and solutions analysis
R4 – risk manipulation B4 – observance of attempts to 
infringe security,
return to analysis
C4 – solution design
R5 – planned improvement C5 – implementation of solutions
C6 – monitoring, after which 
return to the analysis phase 
R1 R2 R3
Operational risk 
management
R4
TSM 
incl. ISMS 
Raporty
R5
B4
B1
B3B2
C5 C6 C1
C3C4 C2
Security provision 
management
Business continuity 
management
Risk management 
maturity 
assessment
Security provision 
maturity  
assessment
Business 
continuity 
management 
maturity  
assessment  
Organisatioal  
Organisationalcycle
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Proposing an approach leading to a comprehensive classification capturing 
the stages of risk actualisation and the characteristics of individual sectors of the 
economy and social activities (Chapter 2). Thus, a research direction was indicated 
on integrated risk management. The preparation of such a classification is still an 
open question.
Indication of the problematic triad “Operational Risk – Security – Business 
Continuity” as a pragmatic recognition of the essence of the managerial challenges 
associated with the variability of the business environment, particularly deriving 
from increasing globalisation and increasing market competition (Chapter 1 and 
Section 3.1).
  Proposing a definition of operational risk, modified in relation to the most 
commonly found version by the Basel Committee (Section 3.3).
  Proposing a classification of types of operational risk based on criteria 
specific to the theory of organisations (Section 3.3).
  Presentation of the advantages of the qualitative analysis of risks and 
qualificative estimation of operational risk, as complementary to the esti-
mation of capital adequacy (Section 4.2). The quality perspective is simpler, 
and at the same time quite sufficient in the context of systematically develop-
ing organisational solutions, to protect against manifestations of risk.
  Proposing monitoring risk a four-level learning approach, bedded in the 
latest concepts of knowledge management.
  Proposing and practical verification of an original method of analysis of 
risk/threats based on the following:
 – identifying, analysing and assessing risk/threat on the basis of an original 
use of various categories of risk classification (described in Section 3.3) 
as the respective perspectives of assessment;
 – selecting security solutions for different categories of risk/threat on gene-
rally accepted principles;
 – verifying the completeness of security on the basis of an originally selected 
set of principles for providing resource security (described in Section 5.1);
 – designing business continuity solutions using the original method described 
in Section 6.3. Risk intensity criteria are used, i.e. the strength of its impact 
and frequency of interaction (Fig. 6.2). The resulting four general attitudes 
threats express economically viable reactions, from prevention through 
monitoring, to the planning of emergency scenarios.
Conclusions 
1. Operational risk management, defined as the triad of “Operational Risk 
– Security – Business Continuity”, is a quintessential management issue 
including the very essence of  effectiveness, efficiency and productivity of 
organisational operations (Chapter 1 and Section 3.1).
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2.	Business	continuity	management	is	a	part	of	management	science	with	
a	target	role	and	value	analogous	to	the	importance	of	reliability	theory	
in	the	field	of	technical	sciences,	already	well	established	in	the	history	
of	science	(Figure	1.1).
3.	From	a	social	perspective	business	continuity	management,	referenced	to	
a	single	organisation,	supplements	the	theory	of	crisis	management	assigned	
to	a	regional	or	national	level	(introduction	to	Chapter	5).
4.	Business	continuity	management	 is	simultaneously	counteracting	opera-
tional	risk.	It	therefore	remains	in	a	relationship	with	other	areas	of	such	
countermeasures,	i.e.	management	of	security	provision	and	quality	mana-
gement	(Figure	S.2).	Since	operational	risk	is	an	expression	of	an	organi-
sation’s	imperfection,	business	continuity	management	is	one	of	the	ways	
of	 improving	 the	organisation	and	 in	 this	 sense	 is	part	of	 the	broader	
understanding	of	quality	management.
Figure S.2. The relationships between Total Security Management and Total Quality Management 
Management of the organisation
TQM (total quality management)
Management of statutory and business risk
TSM (total security management)
Operational risk management
TSM-BCP (business continuity planning)
Personal security management
Physical security management
TISM (total information security management)
IT system security  
management
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5. Risk is associated with every deliberate action by an organisation, and 
arises from the general uncertainty that accompanies every human activity 
(Section 2.1). Risk is manifested in threats, not all of which are relevant to 
a particular organisation. Determining which of them are of importance 
is based on an analysis of the processes and susceptibilities of the organi-
sation as a system of operation and its resources (Section 6.1 and 6.3). 
This analysis serves the development of maps of potential disruption, which 
allows limiting the activities carried out within the framework of business 
continuity management to predictable events (disruptions of known charac-
ter and intensity, occurring in identified places and situations).
6. The model response to the possibility of disruption boils down to four man-
ners of response, called: tolerating, monitoring, prevention and planning 
(Figure 6.2).
7. Business continuity management is a process that requires the assignment 
of a dedicated organisational structure, an identification of the operating 
principles, roles and responsibilities, and the allocation of resources 
(Figure 6.3).
8. Business continuity management requires continuous improvement, due 
to the internal variability of the organisation, its processes and resources, 
and the volatility of the external environment and its impact on the orga-
nisation. An important element of this improvement is the systematic 
gathering of organised knowledge about the phenomena of threats, about 
disruption that has occurred, and in this context the evaluation of solutions 
used so far and available for future remedial action. Similarly important 
is the exercise (testing) of the organisation’s efficiency in solving critical 
situations via simulating the appearance of disruption (Section 6.1).
9. Organisational procedure to ensure business continuity refers to the following 
issues that should be included or ensured (Section 6.1 and 6.3):
  when a given threat affects the organisation’s system of operation or its 
environment, and the system becomes vulnerable to this, we are dealing 
with disruption that:
 – is due to the interaction between the risk and the system of operation 
or the environment of that system,
 – results in significant changes in the operation of the organisation,
 – is not evaluated objectively, and subjectively is evaluated from the 
perspective of a given system of operation.
  as part of the organisation’s business, we must be aware of the possibility 
of disruptions that prevent the normal continuation of that business;
  regardless of the nature of the causes of these events, in formal or in 
business terms of the perceived obligation of due diligence in carrying 
out its tasks, the organisation should strive to continue even limited 
operations;
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  such effort should be based on a previously developed, consistently 
improved and tested business continuity plan, also sometimes called 
(but in a narrower sense) a contingency plan, i.e. a plan to remove 
dysfunctionality;
  ensuring business continuity includes the prediction of scenarios of poten-
tial disruption and separable design of:
 – solutions to prevent the threats themselves (mainly to ensure safety),
 – solutions for dealing as soon as possible with the consequences of 
disruptions,
 – solutions for continuing limited operations in critical conditions;
  the approach to business continuity should be rational, that is, calculated 
to ensure a balance between the expected degree of certainty in main-
taining business continuity and the costs of so maintaining it; it is therefore 
also necessary to assume the gradual surrender of successive elements of 
normal activity appropriate to the dimension of the critical situation 
identified (it does not always make sense, especially in economic terms, 
to make persistent efforts to maintain business continuity).
  the continuity plan should be flexible enough to allow adaptation to 
disruptions deviating from the expectations underlying the original plan;
  it is necessary to define the process essence of of the organisation’s ope-
ration as the minimum activities that must be maintained; the inability 
to continue such minimum activities is the basis for the decision to abandon 
the use of substitute solutions and focus purely on removing the effects 
of disruption;
  in the preparation of the continuity plan, business, legal and organisa-
tional aspects must be considered first and foremost, as these decide on 
the necessary scope of technical solutions;
  business analysis may concern the issue of the company’s prestige, and 
certainly a kind of balance sheet of risk and the financial resources allo-
cated to its limitation; it is reasonable to treat the continuity plan as 
a process of continual improvement, in which the goals will be achieved 
gradually by successive approximations (versions of the business continuity 
plan engaging graduated expenditures from period to period);
  legal analysis is especially important when formulating the assumptions 
of the continuity plan, as it allows to define the scope of the company’s 
liability for various areas of its operations, identify sensitive points, and 
select non-technical forms of security;
  organisational analysis allows the designation of the appropriate staff to 
operate the continuity plan in critical conditions, providing them with 
the scope of decision-making autonomy relevant to such a situation, in 
day-to-day conditions enabling them to prepare for such a difficult role;
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  none of the elements of this analysis, and also the design of technical 
solutions, is a closed stage; improvement of the continuity plan depends 
on constant renewal of the analysis and design of solutions with respect 
to changes in the organisation’s business, development of the continuity 
plan, and conclusions after the materialisation of an actual disruption.
10. In accordance with the ISO 2700x and ISO22301 standards, you must create 
solutions that effectively preserve continuity (Section 6.3). By analogy 
with living organisms, such solutions are intended to provide a capacity 
for homeostasis i.e. a trait of the organisation that consists of initiating 
its own internal mechanism for the prevention of disruption in order to 
restore the state before the emergence of the disruption. The effectiveness 
of solutions to anticipate disruption and their relevance to actual events 
should be placed above the minimum threshold of acceptance by decision-
makers, who usually carry out the assessment based on  two criteria:
  the prestige of the organisation and its  degree of challenge as a result of 
the suspension or restriction of activities,
  the relationship between cost of security solutions and the cost of poten-
tial losses and restoration of the actions harmed by the disruption.
11. A rationally conceived system homeostasis leads to a conscious temporary 
reduction (limited to the time of occurrence of the disruptive factor or the 
effects of disruption) of the quality of action to a level previously set in the 
light of such determinants as:
  the loss of a dissatisfied or injured client,
  benchmarking against competitors and best market practices,
  robust standards of cooperation with partners and customers – SLA 
(Service Level Agreement). 
12. Systematic procedure for disruptions is to determine:
  Which disruption (threats in interaction with the system of operation) 
are subject to remediation, i.e. are covered by the preventive arrange-
ments or procedures to ensure continuity;
  which technical infrastructure facilities are protected against threats,
  which business processes are protected against threats,
  which information flows are protected against threats,
  who is responsible for restoring business continuity in the event of 
disruption.
13. Reducing the operational quality should not last longer than the time 
needed to eliminate the causes and effects of the disruption, and the some-
times the former can resolve spontaneously, if such is the nature of the 
disruption.
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Issues for further research
Uncertainty – the definition of the synthesis of the concept inherent in various 
academic disciplines. The concept of uncertainty is differently formulated in such 
disciplines as philosophy, physics, astronomy, economics, and management. It would 
be useful to examine these interpretations and the temptation to formulate a syn-
thetic approach.
Comprehensive classification of risk, in the form of proposals towards 
research described in Section 2.3.
Identification of risk (threats) in crisis management. At the moment, this 
issue constitutes a gap in the theory of crisis management in the sense of an absence 
of methodological approaches to this problem. It is also of great practical impor-
tance due to current European Union law obliging all levels of government to 
systematically carry out such identification.
Ensuring business continuity in terms of strategic management. Business 
continuity is seen in two perspectives. The operational perspective is described in 
this book. However, in the strategic perspective, business continuity is a postulate 
of the quality and efficiency of an organisation’s operation and its management in 
the aspect closer to the discipline of economics than of management. This issue 
has so far been seen only intuitively.
Ensuring business continuity from the market perspective. Violations of 
business continuity in a single organisation can entail consequences beyond its 
operation, reaching other market participants, and sections of society. The fear of 
such consequences can lead to cooperation between competitors (see the concept 
of co-opetition). 
Ensuring business continuity from the financial perspective. The issue of 
business continuity is related to a company’s financial activities in several respects, 
such as:
  protection against excessive losses,
  costs of continuity solutions,
  ensuring company financial liquidity as an activity that provides business 
continuity.
Relationships between business continuity and crisis management. Crisis 
management (as indicated in Chapter 5) is developing as an autonomous field of 
knowledge and practice. Meanwhile, the relationships between these two issues 
are even intuitively obvious, because they really differ only in scale of social impact, 
and a synergy can easily be imagined in cases of disasters affecting a single orga-
nisation and the wider social community simultaneously.
Relationships between business continuity and organisational manage-
ment in a crisis. An organisation that finds itself in a crisis of any given nature, 
is more susceptible to the effects of threats, including those not directly related to 
the crisis occurring. It can be assumed that the needs of such an organisation in 
terms of business continuity are clearly larger than average.
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Relationships between business continuity and reliability theory. Reliabi-
lity theory has been developed over a hundred years, and it relates to the technical 
creations of humankind. Due to a certain range of parallels between the principles 
of operation of technical devices and organisations, as well as human creations, 
we can assume the suitability of the findings of reliability theory for the theory of 
operational risk management, security assurance theory, and the theory of busi-
ness continuity.
Ensuring business continuity in relation to the concept of an organisation 
characterised by a high level of change. How do we reconcile ensuring business 
continuity with the necessity for continuous changes in an organisation in response 
to a changing environment? These organisational changes are associated with 
destructive actions: first a weakening of the existing state, its change, and then its 
replacement with a new solution, which in turn should be fixed. How do we adapt 
these to the concept of change management, innovation management, agile and 
learning organisations, and finally to knowledge management?
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